Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach by Singleton, Solveig
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 11 Volume XI 
Number 1 Volume XI Book 1 Article 2 
2000 
Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach 
Solveig Singleton 
Information Studies, Cato Institute 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the First Amendment: A Skeptical Approach, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop. 
Media & Ent. L.J. 97 (2001). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol11/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
SINGLETON.FINAL 12/28/00 7:07 PM 
 
 
ARTICLES 
Privacy Versus the First Amendment:   
A Skeptical Approach 
Solveig Singleton* 
INTRODUCTION 
Richard Posner observed many years ago, that regardless of how 
one defines privacy, one aspect of privacy is the withholding or 
concealment of information.1  Recent proposals to regulate the 
uses of transactional information by private businesses in the name 
of privacy raise interesting free speech issues, as the recent case of 
U.S. West v. FCC2 recognized.3  The tension between privacy, the 
First Amendment, and the commercial speech doctrine has barely 
been explored outside of cases involving media defendants and 
privacy torts.4  This article argues that this tension reflects a 
serious conflict between free speech and privacy outside of that 
narrow area. The courts should think twice before sacrificing the 
mature law of free speech to the less coherent concerns about 
privacy. 
Within the United States, lawmakers face growing pressure to 
develop a top-down legal regime for the governance of privacy and 
data. Much of this pressure stems from the differences between 
European Union (EU) countries and the United States.  The EU  
 
 
 *  Director of Information Studies, Cato Institute.  Reed College, B.A. 1987; Cornell 
Law School, J.D. 1992. 
 1 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, AMERICAN ENTER. INST. J. ON 
GOVT & SOCY, May/June 1978, at 19. 
 2  182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 3 See id.  (holding that the FCCs rulemaking on customer information resulting in 
opt-in regulatory regime violates the First Amendment). 
 4 See, e.g., Solveig Singleton, Privacy as Censorship: A Skeptical View of Proposals 
to Regulate Privacy in the Private Sector, CATO INST. POLICY ANALYSIS, Jan. 22, 1998 at 
1; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Information Privacy, and the Troubling 
Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1 
(May 2000); Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of the Press, 14 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329 (1979). 
SINGLETON.FINAL 12/28/00  7:07 PM 
98 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:97 
 
has enacted such a legal regime, known as the Data Protection 
Directive,5 while the United States has not. 
The different legal regimes present a classic trade problem as 
illustrated by the following hypothetical: Country X prohibits or 
heavily regulates certain activity while country Y does not.  The 
activity continues and expands in country Y, while representatives 
in country X become more frustrated.  What do we do?  Tolerate 
the regulatory arbitrage?  Sanction country X to remove its 
regulations, or sanction country Y to adopt them?  In large part the 
answer depends on which country we believe is doing the right 
thing.  With regards to passing data protection laws, there is an 
assumption that the European nations are doing the right thing and 
the United States is not.6  Thus, the United States is pressured to 
move towards a regulatory regime similar to that of the EU. 
Meanwhile, the emerging conflict between privacy and free 
speech threatens to change the dynamic of the debate surrounding 
the extent to which the United States should imitate the EUs 
privacy regulations.  Given this conflict, we must seriously 
reconsider whose approach is in fact the right one. 
Part I of this article explores the foundations of the law of 
privacy in the United States, laying the groundwork for 
understanding how concepts of privacy relate to each other.  Part II 
explores the philosophical conflict between free speech and 
privacy.  Part III examines the commercial speech doctrine and 
outlines the broader implications of the use of data in the private 
sector for the Constitution and human rights. 
I. FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
Privacy as conceived in twentieth century case law is a young 
legal concept, less developed than the law of free speech.7  This is 
not to deny the Fourth Amendments constitutional pedigree.  As 
described below, the concept of privacy has expanded far beyond 
the Fourth Amendment and the assorted doctrines that formed the 
 
 5 Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
6 See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, Data Privacy Law: A Study of United 
States Data Protection (1996). 
7 See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1375 
(1992). 
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basis for privacy protection in the nineteenth century.  Privacy 
today still means that the police cannot search your house without 
a warrant.  However, it also means that the governments rights to 
determine its citizens reproductive functions are limited. In 
addition, some eccentric rights of privacy have grown up to restrict 
private sector activity.  The following sections outline key models 
of privacy and provide some preliminary background on the 
conflict between privacy and the First Amendment. 
A. Government Intrusions on Privacy 
In order to resolve the conflict between the First Amendment 
and privacy rights asserted against the private sector, we must first 
explore how the First Amendment relates to privacy rights asserted 
against the government. 
Obviously, private sector companies that collect data in private 
transactions cannot be charged with violating rights to privacy 
protected by the Constitution.  The Constitution sets forth our 
rights against the government, and these are different than our 
rights against private citizens. In short, there is no state action 
when a private citizen or business collects information about 
another private citizen or business.8  It is important to consider 
how constitutional rights are related to rights asserted against the 
private sector.  This section discusses what those federal rights are.  
We begin with the Fourth Amendment, which provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.9 
The Fourth Amendment does not explicitly mention privacy, 
however, many early cases do.10  The language of the Amendment 
 
 8 See, e.g., United States v. McAllister, 18 F.3d 1412, 1417-18 (7th Cir. 1994); 
United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993); Pleasant v. Lovell, 974 F.2d 
1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 
1990). 
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 10 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886); see generally Nelson B. 
Lasson, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED 
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ties privacy to property rights.11  The framers of the Constitution 
viewed property rights as the root of privacy (as well as other 
rights such as free speech).12  Lord Camdens opinion in the 1765 
case of Entick v. Carrington,13 which involved the seizure of 
private papers, had a powerful influence on the development of 
Fourth Amendment law.14  Lord Camden stated: 
Papers are the owners goods and chattels: they are his 
dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, 
that they will hardly bear an inspection; and though the 
eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass, 
yet where private papers are removed and carried away, 
the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of 
the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in 
that respect.15 
The centrality of property concepts relating to the understanding 
of the Fourth Amendment emerged fully in Boyd v. United 
States,16 when the Court proved itself willing to overlook the 
evident lack of a traditional search or seizure in its zeal to 
protect private papers. 17 
Early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court encountered a 
challenge to this property rights view of private information in a 
case concerning wiretapping telephone conversations. 18  The Court 
observed that if the telephone company does not object, 
wiretapping could not violate its property rights.19  Nor does 
anyone using a telephone have a property right in his or her 
 
STATES CONSTITUTION 47-49 (1937); Jacob W. Landynski, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE 
SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 29 (1966). 
 11 See generally William C. Heffernan, Property, Privacy, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 633 (1994) (arguing that property rights are a relection 
and expression of personal freedoms, and should receive the same protection). 
 12 See id. 
 13 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), 19 Howells State Trials 1029 (1765). 
 14 See id.; see also Nelson B. Lasson, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 47 (1937). 
 15 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 816-17 (K.B. 1765), 19 Howells State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765) 
(Editors Note: Early English Law reporters sometimes offer differing accounts of the 
very same proceedings.  Though the English Reports citation is given to facilitate the 
readers easy retrieval of the subject case, the verbatim quotation is from the Howells 
State Trials version.). 
 16 116 U.S. at 616 (1886). 
 17 See id. 
 18 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 19 See generally id. at 464-66. 
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conversation.20  As a result, the Supreme Court ruled that 
wiretapping did not require compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment.21  Justice Brandeis dissented, following Thomas 
Cooley in speaking of the right to be let alone - the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men.22  Many years later, Brandeis dissent  became the law.   
In Katz v. United States,23 the Court found that wiretappers must 
comply with the Fourth Amendment even when a wiretap does not 
involve a trespass.24  Thus, the Court came to establish a privacy 
right independent of property rights. 
Today a contrary result seems unthinkable,25 and the property 
rights theory of privacy has been subordinated to a new theory.  
Unfortunately, this may be a case of the baby being thrown out 
with the bath water.  Once the link between privacy and property 
rights has been severed, what takes its place?  Whatever it is, it 
cannot literally be a right to be let alone, for that is far too broad.  
Even a right to be let alone, unless the police have a warrant, 
would be a strange legal creature indeed, theoretically barring the 
police from even the most casual inquiries or observations on a 
public street. 
Ultimately, what replaced the property rights theory of privacy 
in modern courts is that the Fourth Amendment protects us from 
infringements upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.26 This 
modern standard is problematic.  As several commentators have 
noted, it is circular.27  This is partly because whether or not one has  
 
 
 20 See id. at 464. 
 21 See id. at 466. 
 22 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 23 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 24 See id. at 359. 
 25 Olmstead was controversial in its day as well. See generally Robert M. Pitler, 
Independent State Search and Seizure Constitutionalism: The New York State Court of 
Appeals Quest for Principled Decision Making, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 45-47 (1996) 
(describing response of state governments to Olmstead). 
 26 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). 
 27 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 
MINN. L. REV. 349, 384-85 (1974) (stating that the expectation of privacy theory is so 
circular that it has no place in a theory of what the Fourth Amendment protects); United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment analysis must transcend the search for subjective expectations). 
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an expectation of privacy will depend on whether the law says one 
does. 
The reasonable expectation of privacy theory gives the courts 
little guidance when genuinely new methods of surveillance arise. 
In particular, it would not have helped to resolve the status of 
wiretapping when Olmstead was decided.  Did a reasonable 
expectation of privacy exist in a telephone conversation in 1928, 
given that wiretapping had been a known method of police 
investigation since the late nineteenth century28 and that 
wiretapping was known to be a common tactic of feuding private 
parties29 and criminals?  What role would this reality play in 
forming the publics expectations?  Would it depend upon whether 
the state in which the wiretap was placed had passed a statute 
concerning wiretapping?30  What if the question had arisen in the 
nineteenth century before any of these uses or state statutes had 
been developed? 
If the property rights standard did not answer the above 
questions, then the reasonable expectation standard does not seem 
to offer any answer at all.  When it comes to new networks and 
new methods of surveillance, the vast majority of people may have 
no expectations whatsoever.  If they do, the expectations may be 
wildly varied or quite unreasonable.  For example, if people today 
have an expectation of privacy on the Internet, it can only exist so 
long as they do not understand the extent to which the technology 
itself is constantly trading information. 
Ironically, the reasonable expectation standard will work best 
when its expectations are based on property rights.  Contracts and 
customs might also be the basis for a reasonable expectation of 
privacy,31 although these will have little or no utility in many new 
cases.  As a general matter, the extent to which the reasonable 
 
 28 See Pitler, supra note 25, at 45-47. 
 29 See, e.g., Washington v. Nordskog, 136 P. 694, 695 (Wash. 1913) (wiretapping by 
Seattle Times of detective agency did not violate law for malicious injury to property 
because wiretapping does not injure property). 
 30 See, e.g., 18 Rem. & Bal. Code § 2656 (P.C. 135 § 805) (Who shall intercept, 
read or in any manner interrupt or delay the sending of a message over any telegraph or 
telephone line.), cited in Nordskog, 136 P. at 695. 
 31 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protections 
defined by reasonable expectations of privacy are not entirely circular because 
expectations are based on objective rules and customs that can be understood as 
reasonable by all parties involved). 
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expectation standard is truly independent of property rights is 
questionable. 
Notably, the reasonable expectation standard does not create a 
right of privacy to records about oneself held by a third party.32  
One is said to have given up ones expectation of privacy when 
one discloses information to a third party.33  Similar results may be 
obtained under the property rights theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, as long as an ownership interest in the information 
disclosed is not retained.34 As discussed below, under most 
circumstances, one will not be able to assert such an ownership 
interest.35 
Next, we briefly consider constitutional rights of privacy not 
directly arising from the Fourth Amendment.  These rights of 
privacy are derived from a penumbra allegedly emanating from 
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.36  With one exception,37 the penumbra has been 
 
 32 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (recognizing that, 
the prevailing law of invasion of privacy generally recognizes that the interests in 
privacy fade when the information involved already appears on [sic] the public record); 
Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that privacy 
protection applies to information which the individual has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy such that to the extent this information is freely available in public records, 
protection will not extend). 
 33 See, e.g., United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 1990) (criminal 
defendant has no expectation of privacy in his pager number because he voluntarily gave 
it to another person); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 437-40 (1976) (criminal 
defendant has no protectable Fourth Amendment interest in his own financial records 
maintained by his bank as he has neither ownership nor possession of the records). 
 34 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (concluding that there can 
be no reasonable expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy protection for refuse placed 
at the curb for the purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector); see 
generally Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that, [w]hat a person 
knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection). 
 35 See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41. 
 36 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (finding a right of privacy 
inherent in areas or zones of privacy to which various constitutional provisions give 
rise); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding a right to privacy in the 
penumbra of the Bill of Rights); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 
U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (holding  unconstitutional portions of a state statute relating to the 
regulation of abortion); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (characterizing 
past Supreme Court decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, and child rearing or educating as generally limiting the states powers to 
regulate certain kinds of fundamental decisions). 
 37 But see, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that possession of 
obscene materials in the home is constitutionally protected, essentially finding a privacy 
right in the First Amendment).  Stanley raises interesting questions but the case is not 
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recognized in cases involving reproductive or sexual functions in 
the context of the privacy of the person or the home.38 As a 
constitutional theory, the penumbra is a suspect creation, but the 
same results could be obtained under a straightforward reading of 
the Ninth Amendment that reserves rights not enumerated in the 
Constitution for the people.39 
Of all the cases raising the issue of government intrusions upon 
privacy, these cases are the least relevant to privacy issues arising 
in the private sector because they involve the freedom to engage in 
physical activities or functions, rather than a right to keep 
information private.  Their closest private-sector equivalent is 
similar to the right to be free of assault or battery.  Additionally, 
these cases do not supply us with a right of privacy independent of 
property rights, because rights to control our own bodies are in 
effect another type of property right. 
One fundamental observation arises from the Fourth 
Amendment and the penumbra cases: The constitutional right of 
privacy against government intrusions rarely, if ever, conflicts with 
the First Amendment.40  The police can claim no First 
Amendment right to trespass on ones property - no more than 
you have a First Amendment right to break into a neighbors house 
to read a poem in his living room.41  In a sense, these 
Constitutional privacy cases are First Amendment rights expressed 
another way.  The right to make ones own decisions about 
reproduction, for example, might easily be expressed as an 
exercise of the First Amendment right of free association.  The 
right not to submit to a search without a warrant is a qualification 
of the right not to speak which the First Amendment also 
 
relevant in resolving a possible conflict between privacy and the First Amendment in the 
private sector, so it will not be discussed further. 
 38 See e.g., Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. at 153 (extending the privacy right to a womans 
right to make autonomous reproductive decisions); Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 601 
(1980) (noting that our nation has long recognized the sanctity of the home in the context 
of unauthorized entry); Russell D. Workman, Balancing the Right to Privacy and the 
First Amendment, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1962-63 (1992) (discussing the history of 
privacy rights found in the penumbras of the Constitution which have come to include 
marriage, childbearing and family relationships). 
 39 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); see also Randy E. 
Barnett, A Ninth Amendment for Todays Constitution, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 419 (1991). 
 40 See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (picketers had no First 
Amendment right to trespass on a shopping center to advertise their strike against a shoe 
company). 
 41 See id. 
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protects.42  The First and Fourth Amendments fit together hand and 
glove; both limit government power in similar ways.43 This is 
important to keep in mind when addressing privacy regulations in 
the private sector. 
B. Privacy and the Private Sector: The Brandeis/Warren Article 
A standard history of privacy rules applicable to the private 
sector in the United States begins with a law review article 
authored by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren in 1890.44  
The authors inspiration was their concern that [t]he press is 
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety 
and of decency.45  Warren, in particular, was irritated to find 
details of his home life described in the society pages of the Boston 
press.46  Brandeis and Warren argued in favor of the creation of a 
new kind of property right in personal information akin to 
defamation.47 Privacy was not a new concept in American common 
law, but the idea of a privacy right independent of other property 
rights was novel.48 
The focus of Brandeis and Warren on the press raises obvious 
First Amendment concerns.  The species of privacy rights 
advocated by Warren and Brandeis would have been a new kind of 
property right similar to defamation in that truth would not be a 
defense.  The Brandeis/Warren article dismisses First Amendment 
concerns, explaining that speech in the public interest would be 
protected.49  The view that the First Amendment protects only 
 
 42 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977). 
 43 See Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1383-
84 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court tends to automatically balance the right to 
privacy against First Amendment freedom of speech essentially regularizing this 
symbiotic relationship). 
 44 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). 
 45 Id. at 196. 
 46 See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 
6 (1979). 
 47 See Gormley supra note 43 at 1345 (Warren and Brandeis right to privacy 
principles illustrated in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article bore a superficial 
resemblance to an action for defamation.). 
 48 See Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1892 (1981). 
 49 See Gormley supra note 43 at 1346 (Brandeis recognized that a limitation to the 
right to privacy did not extend to matters of public or general interest). 
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speech in the public interest, and not other speech was typical of 
Nineteenth Century jurisprudence.50  One wonders why Brandeis, 
later noted for his more radical First Amendment opinions, did not 
address the issue more deeply. 
Part of the reason why Brandeis did not address the issue 
directly may be explained by the historical context in which the 
article was written. Many progressives, including Brandeis, 
became supporters of a broad view of free speech only after World 
War I.51  In August of 1921, Brandeis said in conversation to Felix 
Frankfurter, I have never been quite happy about my concurrence 
in [the] Debs and Schenk cases.  I had not then thought the issues 
of freedom of speech outI thought at the subject, not through it.  
Not until I came to write the Pierce and Shaefer dissents did I 
understand it.52  Brandeiss views on the First Amendment when 
he first wrote about privacy in 1890 were likely quite different 
from his later views.53 
Moreover, Brandeis was not as radical on free speech issues as 
his contemporaries in the legal mainstream.  Unlike the pioneering 
nineteenth century First Amendment scholars, Brandeis was not a 
free speech absolutist.54  Brandeis valued the importance of free 
speech to democratic citizenship.  But he thought the final end of 
the State was to make men free to develop their faculties.55  In 
embracing the idea that the State could be trusted with this goal, 
this view is still fairly favorable to government regulation of 
speech.  According to this view, free speech is a means to 
democratic ends more than an individual right. 
 
 50  See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (stating that freedom of 
speech and of the press . . . does not permit the publication of libels . . . or other 
publications injurious to . . . private reputation). 
 51 See transcript of conversations between Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter 
(manuscript in Brandeis Papers, Harvard, box 114, folder 14), cited in DAVID M. 
RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 362 (1997). 
 52 Id. 
 53 See Helen Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review, Haunted by the Ghost 
of Lochner, 61 WASH. L. REV. 293, 365 n.305 (1986) (Brandies law clerks noted that his 
views on privacy rights were different in 1939 than in 1890 in part due to his hardening 
of ideas, lessening of flexibility, and his Puritan strain.). 
 54  See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
 55 Brandeis, cited in RABBAN, supra note 51, at 370. 
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C. Privacy in the Private Sector: Privacy in Common-Law and 
Equity 
Since the nineteenth century, privacy problems involving 
disputes between private-sector parties arose in rapidly growing 
urban areas as railways developed next to residences and neighbors 
struggled to accommodate the needs for light, air, and privacy.56 
Concepts of privacy were closely entangled with property 
concepts.57  Although a technical trespass was not needed to 
recover, an invasion of privacy alone was not enough unless the 
invader had created a recognizable nuisance or violated a 
cognizable property right in something, such as letters.58 
Easement law sometimes referred to privacy.  One line of cases 
held that it was not wrong to build windows overlooking your 
neighbors lot, but you could not then complain if he built a screen 
on his own property that blocked the view from your windows to 
protect his privacy.59  Most American courts adopted this rule that 
allowed for rapid, unimpeded construction in our cities and 
towns.60  However, under English common law, if you blocked off 
 
 56 See, e.g., Muhlker v. New York and Harlem R.R. Co., 197 U.S. 544, 564 (1905); 
Roman Catholic Church of St. Anthony of Padua v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 207 F. 897, 
903 (3d Cir. 1913). 
 57 See id. 
 58 See Barrett v. Fish, 47 A. 174 (1899) (a right of privacy in letters is based on 
property or possession of letters); Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1867) (a right of property in letters recognized for purposes of distributing letters 
after writers death). 
 59 See Ray v. Sweeney, 77 Ky. (14 Bush) 12 (Ky. Ct. App. 1878) (windows 
overlooking ones property can only be remedied by building a screen); Levy v. Brothers, 
23 N.Y.S. 825 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (owners of premises that built huge iron sheets blocking 
light from neighbors windows did not violate neighbors right to light and air because 
the law would not recognize his loss of property as actionable); Burke v. Smith, 37 N.W. 
838 (1888) (screens blocking view and light from neighbors windows were proved to be 
motivated by malice and not to keep out prying eyes, constituting an illegal nuisance; 
rejected cases in favor of right to erect screens to protect privacy and in favor of easement 
of light and air); Athey v. McHenry, 45 Ky. (6 B. Mon.) 50  (Ky. Ct. App. 1845) (where 
one landowner had secured no easement for light and air, other landowner was entitled to 
erect screens blocking the view of his property); Durant v. Riddell, 12 La. Ann. 746 
(1857) (where defendant had erected screen to block view of bedchamber from his 
veranda to protect plaintiffs privacy, plaintiff could not complain of obstruction of light 
and view); Klein v. Gehrung, 25 Tex. 232 (1860) (no remedy when windows are built 
invading ones privacy than to build a wall); but see Turner v. Thompson, 58 Ga. 268 
(1877) (obstructions designed to protect defendants privacy in her garden must be torn 
down to supply necessary light and air to windows of plaintiff). 
 60 See Guest v. Reynolds, 68 Ill. 478, 488 (1873) (explaining that American courts 
rejected English doctrine of easements of light and air because of rapid pace of building 
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the view from someones windows, they could sue for violation of 
their easement of light and air.61  Nuisance suits also referred to 
privacy concerns.  One line of cases involved disputes over 
windows placed in party walls.62  A party wall was a wall built half 
on a landowners property, and half on the land owned by a 
neighbor as a means of fire prevention.  Such a wall was 
considered a nuisance if windows were built into it.63  In 
nineteenth-century America, a frequent complaint in such suits 
involved the violation of privacy.64  Eavesdropping made up 
another type of nuisance also recognized by English common 
law.65 
Another line of more typical nuisance cases mentioned privacy 
issues along with the more familiar complaints of noise, vibration, 
and dust.66  These cases arose from the construction of railways 
and elevated railway platforms near residences where passengers 
could peer into the windows of houses.67  Damages could be 
recovered for the diminution of the propertys market value, and 
evidence concerning invasions of privacy could be used to 
 
in American cities, and allowing that property owners may build screens blocking off 
light and air to protect their privacy). 
 61 See, e.g., Bury v. Pope, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (Q.B. 1587)  (the owner of land was held 
entitled to erect a house against his neighbors windows even though they had enjoyed 
light for over 30 years). 
 62 See generally Bartley v. Spaulding, 21 D.C. (1 Tuck. & Cl.) (1892) (where 
plaintiff sought an injunction requiring defendant to close windows in a party wall, 
claiming that the windows were an interference of her enjoyment and privacy in certain 
rooms of her house). 
 63 See Vollmers Appeal, 61 Pa. 118 (1869) (party wall with windows looking into a 
neighbors property is a nuisance and can be enjoined by court of equity); Milnes 
Appeal, 81 Pa. 54 (1876); Pierce v. New Orleans, 18 La. Ann. 242 (1866) (affirming 
injunction requiring blocking of windows in party wall to protect the privacy of a 
residence). 
 64 See DAVID FLAHERTY, PRIVACY IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 89 (1972). 
 65  See id. (describing the English common law crime of eavesdropping as listening 
under walls or windows or the eaves of a house, to hearken after discourse, and 
thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales).  Eavesdropping was considered 
to be a common law nuisance.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *168.  See also 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating 
eavesdropping was an ancient practice which at common law was condemned as a 
nuisance). 
 66 See, e.g., Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201, 202 (6th Cir. 1932) 
(defendant enjoined from permitting dust from the operation of an airport to fly or drift in 
substantial and annoying amounts over the plaintiffs property). 
 67 See e.g., Roman Catholic Church of St. Anthony v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 207 F. 
897, 904 (3d Cir. 1913). 
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calculate damages.68  In these cases, American courts followed 
English common law.69 
Following Prossers famous analysis, the growth of common law 
privacy torts during the early part of the twentieth century is often 
attributed to Brandeis and Warrens 1890 article.70  Brandeis and 
Warren reportedly protested that the groundwork for the new 
privacy causes of action was already laid in the common law.71  
What they may take credit for, then, is the cautious steps that 
courts have taken to create new rights in privacy more independent 
of other property rights.72 
The privacy torts that came into being during the twentieth 
century in many states73 include: misappropriation of ones name 
and likeness for commercial purposes; public disclosure of 
embarrassing private facts; publicly placing the plaintiff in a false 
light, and intrusion into the plaintiffs seclusion. 
 
 
 68 See, e.g., Lahr v. Metropolitan Elevated Ry. Co., 104 N.Y. 268 (1886) (recovery 
for nuisance may include recovery for loss of privacy); Fulton v. Short Route Ry. 
Transfer Co., 4 S.W. 332 (Ky. Ct. App. 1887) (speculation that damage to buildings and 
invasion of privacy may occur upon building of railway has adequate remedy at law and 
injunction in equity would not issue); Railway Co. v. Gardner, 13 N.E. 69 (Ohio 1887) 
(violation of privacy may be considered in calculating damages against railway); Story v. 
New York Elevated R.R. Co., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882) (construction of elevated railway is a 
taking of property and loss of privacy is part of damages); Shano v. Fifth Ave. & High St. 
Bridge Co., 42 A. 128 (Pa. 1898) (evidence as to invasion of privacy must be considered 
only as it tends to diminish market value of property); Moore v. New York Elevated Ry. 
Co., 29 N.E. 997 (N.Y. 1892) (stating there is no reason why defendants, who furnished 
the means and opportunity for persons to invade the privacy of plaintiff by constructing a 
railway station and platform, should not be responsible for the consequences of the loss 
of privacy as it depreciated the rental value of the rooms in the plaintiffs building). 
 69 See id. 
 70 See William Dean Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Pavesich v. 
New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905); see also Diane L. Zimmerman, 
Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeiss Privacy Tort, 68 
CORNELL L. REV. 291 (1983) [hereinafter Requiem]  After the article appeared, courts 
and legislatures began to apply the label right to privacy expansively to situations that 
bore little resemblance to those encompassed in the vague Warren-Brandeis 
formulation.  Id. at 296. 
 71 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 19 (1890). 
 72 See Note, supra note 48, at 1893. 
 73 Rhode Island, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin have recognized neither 
common law nor statutory privacy claims.  See Peter Gielniak, Comment, Tipping the 
Scales: Courts Struggle to Strike a Balance Between the Public Disclosure of Private 
Facts Tort and the First Amendment, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1217, n.2 (1999). 
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The false light tort creates a sort of property right in ones 
reputation and, as a number of commentators have noted, bears a 
resemblance to defamation.74  It has little do to with privacy and 
more to do with reputation.75  The information provided is 
presumably false and recovery is limited to cases where the 
representation is substantially inaccurate and the depiction 
offensive to the reasonable person.76  Although the doctrines of 
false light and defamation are today distinguishable, false light 
may very well have originated with defamation.77  In writing about 
defamation, Blackstone stated, A second way of affecting a mans 
reputation is by printed or written libels, pictures, signs, and the 
like; which set him in an odious or ridiculous light, and thereby 
diminish his reputation.78  Consistent with the rule that truth was 
not a defense to a charge of libel,79 Blackstones tort of odious or 
ridiculous light is a species of defamation to which truth is not a 
defense.80 A privacy tort of false light is a species of defamation 
suit to which truth is a defense.81 The eventual evolution of law 
recognizing only a tort of false light but not of ridiculous light 
parallels the evolution of defamation law recognizing truth as a 
defense.82 The constitutional limits on the false light tort have 
paralleled those of libel law.83 False light and defamation law 
continue on a similar coursenarrower, not broader, than 
 
 74 See Farley v. Evening Chronicle Publg Co., 87 S.W. 565 (Mo. Ct. App. 1905) 
(libel case speaking of picture placing plaintiff in a false light); Squires v. State, 45 
S.W. 147 (Tex. Ct. App. 1898) (libel case speaking of placing plaintiff in false light); 
Stewart v. Swift Specific Co., 76 Ga. 280 (Ga. 1886) (holding that a fabricated story 
about a womans afflictions resulting from cat bite was libelous). 
 75 See id. 
 76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625E(a) (1977). 
 77 See supra note 74. 
 78  Blackstone, supra note 65, at *125. 
 79 Defamation law originated with the canon law.  Under canon law, truth was a 
defense to a libel charge.  Truth was also a defense to the ancient English offense of 
spreading a lie about others.  The Star Chamber rejected this tradition, and after the 
Chamber was abolished by the common law, truth was no longer a defense to the charge 
of libel in England, nor in America at the time the First Amendment was drafted.  See 
generally Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 307-08. 
 80 See id. 
 81 See Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 82 See J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: a Requiem, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783, 
835 (1992) (Courts also have almost uniformly held that the same substantive 
defensesboth common law and constitutionalwhich apply to defamation actions also 
apply to false light claims.). 
 83 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1967); Susan M. Gilles, All Truths 
Are Equal, But Are Some Truths More Equal Than Others?, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
725, 734 (1991). 
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nineteenth century interpretations. Some commentators have 
suggested that false light is a dying tort.84 
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion resembles the nuisance suits 
brought in the nineteenth century to protest invasions of privacy 
and the common law of eavesdropping.85  To succeed in a suit for 
intrusion into plaintiffs seclusion, one must show an intentional 
invasion, physical or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or upon his private affairs, or concerns . . . if the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.86 The plaintiff 
must have a reasonable expectation of privacy.87  Intrusion suits 
rarely succeed if the information has been gathered in a public 
space.88  In this sense, the modern expectations standards refer to 
their property-based ancestors.89 
The misappropriation tort90 and its descendant, the right of 
publicity tort,91 create a new, but very limited property right in 
information about oneself.92 Misappropriation cases began to arise 
in the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth 
century when the likeness of private persons were incorporated 
without the persons consent into labels or advertisements for 
 
 84 See generally Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light 
that Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364 (1989) [hereinafter False Light]. 
 85 See Rhodes v. Graham, 37 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. 1931) (discussing how common law 
eavesdropping gives rise to a cause of action for invasion of privacy). 
 86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 87 See Sanders v. American Broad. Co., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (Ct. App. 1997).. 
 88 See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Publg Co., 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953) (photo not 
surreptitiously snapped on private grounds, but rather was taken of plaintiffs in a pose 
voluntarily assumed in a public market place). 
 89 See Dietemann v. Time, Inc. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (permitting recovery 
when pictures taken by guests entering home by subterfuge.); cf. Desnick v. American 
Broad. Co., 44 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (7th Cir. 1995) (intrusion into an apartment); Miller v. 
National Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 681 (Ct. App. 1986); Doe v. B.P.S. Guard 
Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991) (changing areas); Kemp v. Block, 607 F. 
Supp. 1262 (D. Nev. 1985); PETA v. Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995) 
(videotape intrusion backstage at a performance). 
 90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
 91 The right of publicity laws primarily serve sports figures and movie actors trying 
to ensure that they have a monopoly on the distribution and sale of their own images.  See 
id.  It is considered a close cousin of intellectual property law.  See Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard  Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (holding that justifications include providing 
an economic incentive that promotes creative endeavor, and preventing unjust 
enrichment). 
 92 See Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 1994) (The tort of 
misappropriation of name or likeness . . . creates property rights only where a failure to 
do so would result in excessive exploitation of its value.). 
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commercial products.93  It is these cases that first discussed the 
Brandeis/Warren article, as well as early precedents, including 
English cases, that recognized individuals property rights in the 
copies of certain images of themselves.94  Misappropriation creates 
interests similar to those protected by trademark or intellectual 
property law, a property interest in ones own likeness or name.95  
Unlike the Brandeis/Warren article, however, misappropriation 
claims are effectively limited to the use of a name or image in 
product advertising.96 
The tort of public disclosure of embarrassing facts comes 
closest, in theory, to embracing a broad view of property rights in 
personal privacy.  But in practice, skeptical courts have curtailed 
it.97  A plaintiff can recover for public disclosure of embarrassing 
private facts when another party publicizes a matter concerning his 
or her private life, provided the matter would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to the 
public.98  Recovery is limited to cases where shockingly intimate 
information has been revealed.99  The tort is often compared to that 
of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the plaintiff may 
be  required to meet the same high standard of proof to satisfy 
 
 93 See Murray v. Gast Lithographic & Engraving Co., 28 N.Y.S. 271 (C.P. 1894) 
(holding that a man cannot enjoin the publication of a portrait of his child when he gave 
the portrait to his wife); Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908 (Sup. Ct.  1893) (recognizing that 
law and equity protect individual from publication of photo in newspaper without his 
consent); Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899) (rejecting 
Warren & Brandeis analysis, holding that name of public figure could be used on line of 
cigars without his familys consent); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 65 N.Y.S. 
1109 (Sup. Ct. 1900) (holding that a girl may enjoin company from printing her picture 
on boxes of its product) [citing English cases], overruled by Roberson v. Rochester 
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (1902). 
 94 See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905).  This is the 
first case recognizing the right of misappropriation and invasion of privacy. 
 95 See, e.g., Page v. Something Weird Video, 960 F. Supp. 1438 (C.D. Cal. 1996); 
Hicks v. Ballantine Books, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y 1978). 
 96 See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Something Weird Video, 960 F.Supp. at 1442. 
 97 See Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 362 (describing law of public 
disclosure as presenting  phantom tort cases [that] present facts dangerously near the 
edge of triviality based on an evil that judges believe is largely mythical); Harry Kalven, 
Jr., Privacy In Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 326, 336 (1966). 
 98 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 99 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Co., 113 F.2d 806, 807-11 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that 
although article written about plaintiff was merciless in its dissection of intimate details 
about his life, exposure did not reach the level of a tort). 
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constitutional constraints.100  The Court recognized the First 
Amendment problems inherent in restricting the publication of 
truthful matter in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,101 holding that 
the state could not constitutionally forbid a newspaper from 
publishing the name of a rape victim that was a matter of public 
record.102 Again, the Court emphasized that in both privacy and 
libel cases, the information published must be false to be 
actionable.103 
These miscellaneous torts have frequently come into conflict 
with the First Amendment, particularly when brought against the 
press.104 The details of these conflicts have been addressed 
thoroughly by other commentators.105 It is clear from the case law 
that there is a conflict between restrictions on the communication 
of even nonconsensual, personal and embarrassing information 
about individuals and free speech.106 One commentator explains 
that privacy claims raise more serious First Amendment issues 
than defamation: 
[T]he statement that Lawyer X has a secret drug 
addiction, could be the subject of both a libel action and 
a privacy action.  The only distinction is that in the libel 
case the speech must be false and in the privacy case the 
speech could be true.  How can the true speech at stake in 
the privacy case be of less constitutional concern than the 
 
 100 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (applying constitutional 
constraints developed in libel law to suit based on intentional infliction of emotional 
distress); see also Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. 1997). 
 101 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 102 See id. at 491; Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (publication of 
truthful information about a matter of public significance cannot constitutionally be 
punished without a need to further a state interest of the highest order). 
 103 See id. at 490 ([W]here the interest claimed is privacy rather than reputation and 
the right claimed is to be free from the publication of false or misleading information 
about ones affairs, the target of the publication must prove knowing or reckless 
falsehood.). 
 104 See Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting a rape victims claim that documentary broadcast by a television station 
invaded her privacy); Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that 
plaintiffs own conduct was accurately captured by television camera so that false light 
claim against television networks must fail). 
 105 See Sean M. Scott, The Hidden First Amendment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L. 
REV. 683 (1996). 
 106 See Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765), 19 Howells State Trials 
1029 (1765). 
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same, but false, speech involved in the libel case?107 
The privacy torts appear to be losing this conflict, as the 
common law privacy actions have been narrowed over the years.108  
The courts seem reluctant in assigning property rights to a difficult 
concept of privacy and in awarding damages for purely emotional 
injuries.109  Plaintiffs rarely recover under these torts and many 
defendants are granted summary judgment.110  Generally, 
companies that gather information about consumers for credit 
reports or mailing lists do not violate the invasion of privacy 
standards of liability.111 
D. Recent Proposals to Regulate Speech in the Private Sector 
Fear of new computer network technology, especially the 
Internet, combined with the development of databases that use this 
technology, provide a powerful and emotional impetus for the 
creation of new privacy rights which could potentially affect all 
media.  Proposals to regulate the uses of information by private-
sector companies have begun to proliferate in the states and in 
Congress.112 
 
 
 107 Gilles, supra note 83, at 736. 
 108 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words About 
Troublesome Old Torts Poured Into New Jugs, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 355, 374 (1985) 
(describing factors that limit privacy torts) [hereinafter Real People]. 
 109 See id. at 370 (discussing privacy claims brought against authors of fiction); 
Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at n.5 (finding fewer than 18 cases in which a 
plaintiff was actually awarded damages or found to have stated a cause of action 
sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment or to dismiss); Lyrissa Barnett 
Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should 
Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 207 (1998) (citing study showing that from 1986-1996 
defendants prevailed on summary judgment nearly 90 percent of the time). 
 110 See Zimmerman, Real People, supra note 108, at 374 (Most courts have . . . 
shown commendable hesitancy about allowing plaintiffs to prevail in actions involving 
the right of publicity claim, except when the use complained of is related to advertising or 
product marketing.). 
 111 See Scott Shorr, Note, Personal Information Contracts: How to Protect Privacy 
Without Violating the First Amendment, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1756 (1995) (describing 
failure of claims against credit bureaus). 
 112 See Center for Democracy & Technology, Privacy 106th Congress: Summary of 
Major Consumer Internet Privacy Bills in the 106th Congress (Nov. 6, 2000), available 
at http://www.cdt.org/legislation/106th/privacy/. Privacy Journal, The Latest from PJ: A 
Ranking of States in Privacy Protection (1997) available at 
http://www.townonline.koz.com. 
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These proposals seek to establish one or more of the following 
requirements: (a) disclosure -  notice to the consumer describing 
how information will be used or transferred to third parties;113 (b) 
opt-out  providing an opportunity for the consumer to choose 
not to have his information used or transferred to third parties 
(currently, consumers have the right to opt-out of list sales, 
though only a minority exercise it);114  (c) opt-in - an alternative 
to opt-out, under which the consumers information may be used 
only with his express consent;115 (d) access - a requirement that the 
business provide the customer with the information it holds about 
the consumer upon request, and provide an opportunity for errors 
to be corrected.116 
One model for current domestic regulatory proposals is the 
European Unions Data Protection Directive.  The basic ground 
rules for privacy for members of the EU are laid down in the EU 
Data Protection Directive (95/46/ED).117  The Data Protection 
Directive applies to both electronic and old-fashioned paper filing 
systems.118  The data covered by the directive are information 
about an individual that somehow identifies the individual, either 
by name or otherwise.119  Each national government has the 
authority to implement the directive in its own way.120 
The Data Protection Directive begins by laying down basic 
privacy principles, starting with the idea that information should be 
collected for specific, legitimate purposes only, and stored in 
 
 113 See UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION. BUREAU OF CONSUMER 
PROTECTION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS §III(A)(1) (June 1998), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/index.htm.  
 114 Information Infrastructure Policy Committee, Draft for Public Comment: Option 
for Promoting Privacy on the National Information Infrastructure, at 46 (April 1997). 
 115 PRIVACY ONLINE § III(A)(2). 
 116 PRIVACY ONLINE § III(A)(3). 
 117 Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
 118 Id. art. 3, §1 at 39 (This Directive shall apply to the processing of personal data 
wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the processing otherwise than by automatic 
means of personal data which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of 
a filing system.). 
 119 Id. art. 2 at 38. 
Personal Data shall mean any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (data subject); an identifiable person is one who 
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural, or social identity. 
See id. 
 120 Id. ch. II, art. 5 at 39. 
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individually identifiable form no longer than necessary.121  The 
directive goes on to create specific rights for the person the 
information concerns - the data subject.122  The entity collecting 
the information must give the data subject notice explaining who is 
collecting the data, who will ultimately have access to it, and why 
the data is being collected.123  The data subject also is given the 
right to access and correct the data.  Financial data is not treated in 
any special way.124 
The rules are stricter for companies that want to use data in 
direct marketing or to transfer the data for other companies to use 
in direct marketing.125  The data subject must be explicitly 
informed of these plans and given the chance to object.126  Stricter 
rules also govern sensitive information relating to racial and ethnic 
background, political affiliation, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
trade-union membership, sexual preferences, and health.127  To 
collect this information the data subject must give explicit 
consent.128  The law does, however, admit several exceptions, 
including exemptions for employment contracts, non-profits, and 
the legal system.129 
Musing over the principles laid down by the directive - the idea 
that one has the right to notice and consent to the use of 
information about oneself, and to access and correct this 
information - one might well ask whether how such broad 
principles can be reconciled with many vital or convenient human 
activities.  Indeed, they cannot be.  Thus, the directive has become 
riddled with exceptions.130 
There is an exemption for data kept for personal and household 
use, so that one may keep an address book with the names of 
college friends and distant uncles.131  Synagogues, trade unions, 
 
 121 Id. ch. II,  art. 6(b), (d), (e) at 40. 
 122 Id. ch. II, § IV at 41-42. 
 123 Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281), ch. II, § IV, art. 10 at 41. 
 124 Id. ch. II, § IV, art. 10(c) at 41. 
 125 Id. ch. II, § VII, art. 14(b) at 43. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. ch. II, § III, art. 8(1) at 40. 
 128 Id. ch. II, § III, art. 8(2)(a) at 40. 
 129 Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281), ch. II, § III, art. 8(2)(b), (d), (e) at 
40-41. 
 130 See, e.g., id. ch. II, § VI, art. 13 at 42. 
 131 Id. ch. I, art. 3(2) at 39. 
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churches, and other non-profits are permitted to keep even 
sensitive information about their members.132  National 
governments may exempt journalists from provisions of the 
directive when, in the governments view, the interest in free 
speech outweighs privacy interests.133  Finally, governments 
conveniently exempt themselves from the directive when it comes 
to the states own monetary or financial interests (e.g. taxation) or 
criminal matters.134 
Within the United States, as of this writing, 35 privacy bills are 
pending in 22 states, many of which would adopt a restrictive opt-
in approach.135  One example is S. 129 (1999), repeatedly 
introduced in California by Senator Peace, and modeled upon the 
European approach.136  The California bill would mandate that 
companies implement opt-in notices for the collection, storage, 
and use of information for marketing purposes.137  A New York 
bill, S.B. 691/A.B. 696 (1999), would also establish opt-in for 
sharing information with third parties, as would H.B. 5962 (1998) 
in Michigan.138 
Congress has also been drawn to the privacy issue, particularly 
in connection with privacy on the Internet.139  Users familiar with 
the Internet are likely to be aware that part of the way the Internet 
operates is by the ceaseless exchange of information between 
nodes and machines, and of the routine practice of electronic 
merchants in deploying cookies.140  But this effortless information 
sharing is invisible to new-users and may startle them when they 
first become aware of it.141 
 
 132 Id. ch. III, art. 8(2) at 40-41. 
 133 Id. ch. II, § II, art. 7(f) at 40. 
 134 Id. ch. I, art. 3(2) at 39. 
 135 An opt-in requirement would force businesses to receive consumer consent 
before their personal financial information could be sold or used for marketing purposes.  
See Rob Garver, Trade Group Coalition Draws Up Battle Plan Against Privacy Laws, 
THE AM. BANKER, March 3, 2000, at 2.  See generally Privacy Legislation in the States: 
1999 Trends, PRIVACY AND AM. BUS. SPECIAL ISSUE, Sept./Oct. 1999 at 1, 3. 
 136 S.B. 129 (2000), WL 2000 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 984. 
 137 See Catherine G. Gillespie, Legal Affairs: States Take the Lead in Privacy, CREDIT 
CARD MGMT., March 1999. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See, e.g., Data Privacy Act of 1997, H.R. 2368, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 140 See American Survey: We Know Youre Reading This, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, 
at 27; see also Virtual Privacy, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 16. 
 141  See Customers Weary About Providing Information Online, ELEC. COMMERCE 
NEWS, May 1, 2000. 
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The recent publicity regarding DoubleClicks decision to change 
its privacy policy, which at one time was not to link real-world 
data with Internet-based data gathered through cookies, raised 
some interesting common-law questions.142  However, it cannot be 
the law that a privacy policy can never be changed.  Such a policy 
would simply make companies far more hesitant to adopt privacy 
policies in the first place.  DoubleClicks newly announced 
practice of linking cookie information to real world data was 
unlikely to result in anything worse than more informed sales 
practices on the part of their client companies.  This is hardly a 
threat to anyone, even if DoubleClick was not planning to provide 
opportunities to opt-out (as they had announced they were).  
Judging by the reactions of privacy advocates, however,143 one 
would think that DoubleClick was torturing puppies or 
demolishing old-growth forest.  The furor was unfortunate and 
strongly indicative of the sensationalism and lack of proportion 
typical in the rush to privacy regulation.  A strong regulatory 
reaction threatens to stifle the freely evolving, seamless 
communications technology that has been the core strength of the 
Internet.144  Such a response came in mid-2000 from the FTC in its 
proposal to ask Congress for broad privacy regulation for the 
Internet.145 
Today a number of bills are pending in Congress to regulate 
Internet privacy, these include bills proposed by Senator Leahy (D-
Vt.), S. 854, by Representative Markey (D-Mass.), H.R. 3321, by 
Representative Vento (D-Minn.), H.R. 2882, and by 
Representative Frelinghuysen (R-N.J.), H.R. 3560.146  Senator 
 
 142 See generally Privacy Protections for Consumers, Congressional Testimony by 
Federal Document Clearing House, 2000 WL 23833559 (Oct. 11, 2000) (prepared 
statement of Andrew Shen, Policy Analyst, Electronic Privacy Information Center).  
DoubleClick proposed to create detailed profiles on Internet users. The company came 
under fire for linking personal information such as a name and address to online profiles - 
records of what Internet consumers were doing online. 
 143 See, e.g., Chris OBrien, Lawsuit Against On-Line Ad Firm Raises New Questions 
On Privacy; Some Wonder Whether Policies Can be Trusted, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 2000, at 
C13. 
 144 See generally Shane Ham and Robert D. Atkinson, DoubleClick and Online 
Privacy: The Risks of Overreaction, PROGRESSIVE POLY INST. BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 
2000 (on file with author). 
 145 See Claudia Willen, FTC Changes Its Tune (Govt. Activity), 3 INTELLIGENT 
ENTER. 11, July 17, 2000. 
 146 See Lot of Steam For Online Privacy Legislation On Hill, COMMUNICATIONS 
DAILY, Mar. 7, 2000. 
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Conrad Burns (R-Mont.) introduced S. 809, which would require 
web sites to give notice, consent, and access before data about 
online consumers could be used, with several exemptions, such as 
those for transactional data (defined as information necessary for 
using the Internet) and personal data related to legitimate business 
activities (such as answering a customers email).147  Another bill, 
H.R. 1685 was introduced by Representative Rick Boucher (D-
Va.).148  This bills privacy provisions simply require detailed 
notice of the uses of personally identifiable information collected 
online.149 
The typical features of proposed privacy regulation permit 
businesses to learn about their customers only under constraining 
circumstances.150  Because of low response rates, opt-in, in 
particular, represents close to an effective ban on business ability 
to communicate truthful information about real events in which the 
business was involved to other businesses or third parties.151  In 
U.S. West v. FCC,152 the Tenth Circuit considered a challenge to a 
Federal Communications Commission rule that established an 
opt-in requirement for the telephone companys use of 
customers proprietary network information (CPNI).153  The 
companies would be required to obtain explicit consent from a 
customer before the company could use his or her information for 
marketing.154  The court found that the rule restricted speech, 
rejecting the governments argument that the telephone companies 
remained free to contact customers using non-targeted methods.155  
The court described several cases that struck down regulations of 
direct solicitation of customers, and concluded that the existence of 
non-targeted alternatives was not a substitute for restricted 
speech.156  The court reasoned that this was because the First 
Amendment protects the right to receive speech, not just the right 
 
 147 See id. 
 148 See Shira Levine, Following the Flow, AMERICAS NETWORK, October 1, 2000. 
 149 See id. 
 150 See Jessica Litman, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? 
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000). 
 151 See U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1232 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 152  182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 153 See Dana Grantham Lennox, Hello, Is Anybody Home? Deregulation, 
Discombobulation, and the Decision in U.S. West v. FCC, 34 GA. L. REV. 1645 (2000). 
 154 See id. 
 155 See id. 
 156 See id. 
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to speak.157  The court in U.S. West concluded that the opt-in 
regime did not amount to an outright ban on speech so it was not 
subject to the enhanced scrutiny of outright bans on commercial 
speech that the Supreme Court had developed in 44 Liquormart.158 
While the latter conclusion is consistent with the existing case 
law, it does not make very much sense.  This points to a problem 
with the courts commercial speech analysis.  Why does a 
regulation that restricts speech in most cases get less constitutional 
scrutiny than one that restricts it in all cases?  Arguably, the former 
is more narrowly tailored and more likely to pass any test - but 
why a different test?  The fact that some speech is allowed does not 
at all seem relevant to the question of the constitutionality of the 
restrictions on the speech that is not allowed.  The content of 
targeted speech is likely to be quite different from speech 
broadcast to the masses and the latter cannot therefore possibly be 
a near substitute for the former.  The commercial speech doctrine 
thus seems to be out of sync with holdings in other areas of First 
Amendment law.159  Perhaps this is related to the mysterious 
reasoning in some cases that commercial speech is hard to chill 
because it is for-profit,160 reasoning that would apply equally well 
to newspapers and books.  But, opt-in does not merely chill 
speech, it outright prevents it in most cases because of the costs of 
compliance and the risks of liability.161 
Even a law requiring disclosure alone can amount to a ban of 
exchanges of information that could not be foreseen by the 
business at the time of the initial transaction.  Europes experience 
shows us that the total effect of such regulations is a reduction in 
the amount and quality of information that has flowed freely in the 
shared domain between businesses and consumers, or the 
prevention of the growth of such libraries altogether.162  The 
 
 157 See U.S. West,  F.3d at 1232. 
 158 See id. at 1234, n. 5 (discussing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 
495 (1996)).  Indeed, the telecommunications carriers may utilize a multitude of 
communication channels to say whatever they want to their customers.  See id. 
 159 Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Communications on the Internet: Beginning the Millennium 
with Disparate Standards, 75 WASH. L. REV. 785, 816 (2000). 
 160 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1973); Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1975). 
 161 See, e.g., Banks Stand to Lose Income from New Data Protections, CREDIT RISK 
MGMT. REPORT, February 23, 2000. 
 162 See Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in 
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315 (2000). 
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consumer is given a unique veto power over anothers ability to 
learn about him or her, a power that cannot be granted without 
diminishing the freedom of others.  Because we do not own 
information about ourselves as a general rule, this veto power 
represents a drastic upheaval in the normal rules of human society.  
Like a sudden broadening of privacy torts, copyright law, or 
trademark law, most proposed regulation shrinks the public 
domain.  This conflict is seen between the expansion of copyright 
law or trademark law163 and free speech, but privacy law does not 
have the constitutional sanction that intellectual property law 
does.164 
II. WHO OWNS INFORMATION?  FREE SPEECH VS. PRIVACY 
This part addresses the conflict between privacy and free speech 
from a philosophical perspective rather than from a litigators 
perspective.  At the constitutional level, the conflict between 
privacy and free speech appears to be yet another balancing 
question.  Because the rights of free speech and privacy are equally 
important, our legal system must somehow provide for both. 
Many issues call for balancing, however, what is called for here 
is compromise.  One cannot balance a contradiction.  Moreover, if 
one of the asserted interests in the balance is incoherent, it ought 
not to be weighed in the balance at all.  The purpose of this part, 
therefore, is to explore the logic of privacy in great detail, to 
determine exactly what rights are being asserted and how they 
conflict with rights of free speech. 
A. The I Own Information About Myself Argument 
Privacy is often defined as the right of the subject of the 
information to control how the information is used and whether it 
 
 163 See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications 
of the  Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158 
(1982) (arguing that since misappropriation and dilution theories of trademark 
infringement may protect holders where no consumer confusion exists, application of 
these theories may implicate First Amendment concerns, especially when the challenged 
use is solely to communicate ideas); Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A 
Fair Use and First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REV. 1079 (1986). 
 164 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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is to be communicated to third parties.165  Privacy advocates assert 
that people have a general right to control the use of information 
about themselves.166  This implies that anyone wishing to transfer 
or collect almost any kind of information should first get the 
permission of the person whom the information concerns.167  This 
is sometimes described as a right to own information about 
oneself.168 For those who shy away from property rights 
language, this might simply be expressed as a right to control 
information about oneself. Under this view, privacy is an 
assignable right.169 
This idea is familiar in medical and legal ethics and perhaps in 
other special professional relationships.170  In these relationships 
the expectation makes sense.  The legal and medical professions 
understand that clients and patients will not confide in them 
without the right of confidentiality.171  Even if this right did not 
exist by statute, it is implicit in the agreements under which a 
doctor treats his patient172 or the lawyer counsels his client.173  This 
 
 165 See Oscar M. Ruebhausen & Orville G. Brim, Jr., Privacy and Behavioral 
Research, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1184, 1189 (1965) (defining privacy as the freedom of the 
individual to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which, and 
most importantly, the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior, and opinions are to 
be shared with or withheld from others); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 
(1968) (describing informational control as an aspect of personal liberty); ALAN F. 
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) (Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, 
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others.). 
 166 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
 167 See, e.g., Andrew L. Shapiro, Privacy for Sale: Peddling Data on the Internet, THE 
NATION, June 23, 1997, at 11. 
 168 See Ram Avrahami, Privacy Petition-Background Information, Feb. 1997, at 2 (on 
file with the author). 
 169 See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and 
Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 168-69 (1993). 
 170 See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS 410 (4th ed.1994). 
Rights to privacy are valid claims against unauthorized access that have their 
basis in the right to authorize or decline access.  These rights are justified by 
rights of autonomous choice . . . expressed in the principle of respect for 
autonomy.  In this respect, the justification of the right to privacy is parallel to 
the justification of the right to give an informed consent . . . .  
See id.  Beuchamp and Childress define privacy as a state or condition of physical or 
informational inaccessibility.  See id. at 407. 
 171  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT R. 1.6 comment. (1983).  See also 
AMERICAN MED. ASSN, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, E-505 Confidentiality, available at 
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2503.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2000). 
 172 See, e.g., DeMay v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881); Horne v. Patton, 287 So. 
2d 824 (Ala. 1973) (doctor-patient relationship entails obligation of confidentiality); 
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understanding is informed by decades or even centuries of 
custom.174 
The individuals right to control information is far from implicit 
in other human relationships, such as ordinary business 
relationships.  To the contrary, humanitys established freedoms 
have always included, with narrow exceptions, the right of human 
beings to learn about one another.  In the course of a single day, 
individuals process an enormous amount of information about the 
people they encounter, such as their age and appearance, their 
manner of speaking and dressing, and their actions and 
preferences.  Generally, people do not feel obligated to ask for 
anyones permission before relaying the information they have 
collected to a third party, however embarrassing the subject of the 
information might be. 
This default rule enables the practice of journalism.  Journalists 
have no general obligation to get permission before writing a story 
about anothers activities, even though the story and the details that 
they report may be very personal or sold for commercial value.175  
Journalists often use information available over computer networks 
to develop and track important news stories.  While a newspaper 
may be penalized if the information it publishes violates copyright 
laws, is defamatory, or violates other common law rights, these 
exceptions are very narrow and themselves often collide with First 
Amendment rights of free speech.176  Thus, no general consent 
 
Geisberger v. Willuhn, 390 N.E.2d 945 (Ill. Ct. App. 1979) (statutory right equated with 
contract right); McDonald v. Clinger, 482 A.D.2d 482 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (tort and 
contract liability theories against doctor); Peterson v. Idaho First Natl Bank, 367 P.2d 
284 (Idaho 1961) (implied duty of confidentiality exists between bank and client). 
 173 See Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng. Rep. 401 (K.B. 1836); In re Boone, 83 F. 944, 
952-57 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (describing duties of attorney to client at common law). 
 174  See In re Boone, 83 F. at 953 (stating that the rule of confidentiality needs no 
positive enactment because it springs from the very nature and necessities of the 
attorney-client relationship). 
 175  See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (newspaper may publish rape 
victims name once it is a matter of public record); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 
(1967) (magazine cannot be liable for inaccurate portrayal of an individuals private life 
unless the plaintiff establishes knowing or reckless falsehood); Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publg Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (state law punishing truthful publication of the names of 
juvenile offenders violates First Amendment). 
 176 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (newspaper may be 
held liable for defamatory statement against public official only if plaintiff proves the 
statement was made with actual malice); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. National 
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (magazines right to publish extensive quotations from 
leaked manuscript in violation of copyright law not protected by First Amendment). 
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requirement applies to journalists.177 
This requires us to consider the details of exactly what it means 
to assert a right to control information about oneself.  Assume that 
a given individual, Grendel, is very ugly, and wishes to conceal 
that information from others.  As long as Grendel remains at home 
behind closed doors, that information remains with him.  It is 
shielded from others partly by his property rights because the 
public does not have the right to march up to his window and peer 
in on him.  It is also shielded partly by technology because Grendel 
has installed the protection of window blinds.  In this sense, the 
information is entangled with Grendels property and no one in the 
private sector has the right to wrest it from him. 
As soon as Grendel steps into the presence of other people, or 
invites people into his home, they will make observations about 
him that are in no sense his property.  He has disclosed his 
appearance to them.  Perhaps stated more accurately, they have 
used their eyes, ears, and other senses to create their own 
information about him.  This information exists in the form of 
thoughts and sense impressions in their minds.  It is conceptually 
very difficult to imagine Grendel having a right to control a 
thought in someone elses mind, even when that thought may later 
become an observation in a notebook, a comment to a coworker, or 
an email to a company. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine how the legal community 
would deal with a new set of rights that broadly reassigns the right 
to control the flow of information from the perceivers of that 
information to the subjects of the information.  Possession and 
control of this type of information would generally be in different 
hands, a situation likely to yield endless disputes and extreme 
challenges for enforcement. 
One might argue, in response, that when Grendel left his house, 
he implicitly consented to giving up his right to information 
concerning himself to the public.  It may also be argued that 
explicit consent should be required for any information transfer, 
other than information learned through casual viewing in a public 
place.  This argument is interesting but problematic.  It is difficult 
 
 177  See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 491 (noting that without the 
information provided by the press, people would be unable to vote intelligently or register 
opinions on the government). 
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to uncover what the concept of consent means in these 
circumstances, because it is hard to conceive of consent to relay 
information learned through casual viewing being withdrawn.  If 
the public is observing Grendel only on Grendels terms, could 
Grendel march out into the street waving a sign saying, If you 
look at me, you may not repeat the observation that I am ugly to 
anyone else and make this legally binding on anybody?  One 
would think not.  Grendels consent or lack thereof is not relevant.  
His entry into others spheres of observation simply becomes an 
occasion for them to learn things about him.  This is part of the 
nature of the world, a default rule of human interactions, and not 
something to which we consent to. 
There is no reason to believe that business transactions take 
place under a fundamentally different set of default rules.  They 
too are human interactions.  For example, if one purchases a 
lawnmower from Sears, the sale of the lawnmower is an actual 
event involving a real person.  The opinion that information, such 
as the purchasers name, address, and buying habits should not be 
recorded and transferred without his consent conflicts with the 
default rule that facts and ideas, including our names and 
addresses, remain free for all to collect and exchange.178  While it 
is possible for both parties to the transaction to agree to a different 
set of rules governing that information, unless an explicit 
arrangement has been arrived at, there is no reason for either party 
to suppose that something other than the ordinary default rules 
permitting disclosure are operating. 
It may also be argued that information learned about consumers 
in the course of a transaction is different in the commercial context 
because the information has monetary value.  Generally, however, 
that value is determined by how the business collecting the data, 
aggregates, and analyzes it.  The consumers name, address and so 
on have little or no value except in connection with the other 
names in the collection. 
It is relevant to compare intellectual property law with the idea 
that people own information about themselves.  Copyright law 
protects only the authors original expression (her choice of words, 
 
 178  See generally U.S. West, 162 F.3d at 1232 (holding that a law which prevents a 
merchant from communicating with or targeting customers, or limits anything that might 
be said to them is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech). 
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phrases, and sentences), not the facts and ideas that she 
expresses.179  One may not copyright the historical facts of the 
battle at Verdun; likewise, one may not copyright the fact that he 
or she bought a lawnmower from Sears.180  Patent law is also 
limited.  It creates a property right in ideas, but only in certain new 
ideas within a narrow technical sphere.181  Both copyright and 
patent laws are thus much narrower than the proposed right to own 
information about oneself. 
B. Do New Databases Cross an Invisible Line? 
There is an obvious similarity between information collected in 
databases about consumers and the information people exchange 
regularly with one another informally.  With the inclusion of large 
amounts of data in modern databases, each additional factoid may 
be fairly trivial and harmless when taken by itself, but may be 
disturbing to some when taken together.  This leads us to ask the 
question: Is commercial tracking essentially different from gossip?  
The question does more than set up a potentially informative 
analogy.  It is another way of pointing out that the default rule for 
information exchanges in human society heavily favors the free 
exchange of information.  Why change the rule now?  Gossip may 
be despised, but it is not illegal. 
Oral or email gossip and the collection of transactional data in 
the commercial sector are the same in several vital respects.  Both 
reflect the same general default rule about the freedom of 
information.  In addition, both  exchange information about 
reputation, behavior, and trustworthiness, which are very important 
in human society. 
Anthropologists observe that gossip holds communities 
together.182  Gossip is defined as informal, private 
 
 179  See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). 
 180  See Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (No 
matter how original the format . . . the facts themselves do not become original through 
association.). 
 181  See 35 U.S.C.S. § 101 (1994) (The Act states, in part, that [w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the 
condition and requirements of this title.). 
 182  See Sally Engle Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in REPUTATION: STUDIES 
IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT, at 50 (Daniel B. Klein, ed. 1997). 
SINGLETON.FINAL 12/28/00  7:07 PM 
2000] PRIVACY VERSUS THE FIRST AMENDMENT 127 
 
communications between an individual and a small, selected 
audience concerning the conduct of absent persons or events.183  
In non-literate societies, gossip can be an important means of 
storing community history.184  Thus, gossip serves both a social 
and an economic function.185  After reviewing evidence on the 
function of gossip in ancient and modern communities, Professor 
Diane Zimmerman concludes that: 
[t]he privacy literature . . . has rarely acknowledged a . . . 
body of evidence, casting doubt on the preeminent value 
of privacy and suggest that the communication of 
information about such personal matters may serve a 
successful and productive social function. . . History, 
religious doctrines, literature, and the social sciences are 
replete with examples that suggest our society is at least 
ambivalent about the weight to assign to interests in 
personal privacy when they compete with the value of 
truthfulness about the character and activities of our 
neighbors.186 
Gossip and other informal personal contacts serve an important 
function in advanced economies.  In Nineteenth Century America, 
entrepreneurs would increase their sales by acquiring information 
about their customers.  Customers relied on their neighborhood 
banker, whom they knew since childhood, to grant them credit.  
They would return again and again to the same stores for 
personalized service.  
Today, however, most residents of the United States can escape 
neighborhood gossip by moving to larger cities.  Many business 
exchanges occur between strangers who will never meet again.  
This anonymity has many benefits, as formal freedoms and 
growing wealth allow people to flee the oppressive constraints of 
family, local community, or figures of petty authority, for the 
anonymityand anomie?of life in large metropolitan areas.187  
Such anonymity also has disadvantages, as noted by Adam Smith: 
 
 183  See id. 
 184 See id. 
 185 See id. at 54. 
 186 Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 326. 
 187 Jeremy Shearmur & Daniel B. Klein, Good Conduct in the Great Society: Adam 
Smith and the Role of Reputation, in REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY 
ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT at 29 (Daniel B. Klein, ed. 1997). 
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While a man . . . remains in a country village his conduct 
may be attended to, and he may be obliged to attend to it 
himself . . . . But as soon as he comes to a great city, he is 
sunk in obscurity and darkness.  His conduct is observed 
and attended to by nobody, and he is therefore likely to 
neglect it himself, and to abandon himself to every low 
profligacy and vice.188 
In large anonymous environments, where strangers deal with 
strangers, informal gossip networks can break down. The growth 
of modern popular journalism (despised by Brandeis and Warren) 
developed simultaneously with the destruction of many private 
networks through urbanization.189  However, city dwellers have 
actively sought to keep such private networks going, and 
sociologists have noted that the free exchange of personal 
information continues to play a key social role in modern 
society.190 
Meanwhile, economic actors must develop new mechanisms of 
relaying information to each other about fraud, trust, and behavior 
of potential customers.  Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century 
and throughout the Twentieth Century, formal credit reporting 
began to evolve out of gossip networks.191  Dun & Bradstreet, 
which reports on the creditworthiness of businesses, originated 
with Lewis Tappan.192  Tappan managed credit accounts in his 
brothers silk business and exchanged letters with 180 
correspondents throughout the country about the creditworthiness 
of businesses in their communities.193  Forty years ago, 
community-based nonprofit organizations handled consumer credit 
reporting.194  Three nationwide for-profit firms now handle this.195  
Today, retailers continue to struggle with the problem of providing 
personalized service, controlling inventory, and dealing with fraud 
in a more mobile world with fewer regular customers.  The 
 
 188 Id. at 34. 
 189 See Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 333. 
 190 See id., at 333-34. 
 191  See Daniel B. Klein, Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust by Voluntary Means, in 
REPUTATION: STUDIES IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT, at 7 (Daniel 
B. Klein, ed. 1997). 
 192  See id. 
 193 See id. 
 194  See id. 
 195 See id. 
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advent of the Internet has turned this struggle into a crisis. 
An Internet merchant is in the position of a blindfolded 
shopkeeper.  Her ears are also blocked as she can not respond to 
comments customers make about her display.  She does not know 
whether customers look like shoplifters.  She cannot guess whether 
the customer is a local or a tourist, a one-time visitor or a regular, 
or a businessman or a housewife.  She does not know the 
nationality, age or gender of the customer.  Online, strangers are 
dealing with ever more distant strangers.  The collection of data 
using cookies and other devices has become part of the way the 
Internet works as a natural substitute for the incredible array of 
information we get through gossip, face-to-face encounters,196 and 
traditional, not-very-detailed compilations of public records. 
The equivalence of gossip and consumer databases suggests that 
there is no need to treat the evolution of databases as a crisis.  
Those who argue for a new legal regime for privacy, however, 
view new uses of information as having crossed an invisible line 
between permissible gossip and violative information collection.197  
While the use of new technology to collect information may make 
people uneasy, is there any reason to suppose that any harm that 
might result will amount to greater harm than the harm that could 
come from being a victim of vicious gossip? 
Advocates of the creation of new privacy rights argue that the 
compilation of data about consumers does more damage than 
gossip because it takes place on a larger scale.198  Brandeis and 
Warren argued that as long as gossip was oral . . . [ones] peace 
and comfort were . . . slightly affected by it.199  The same view is 
echoed today: 
Twenty years ago, say, the local butcher might know that 
Mrs. Jones bought a ham every Saturday.  That was, in a 
sense, public information.  Yet it was not widely 
available.  Perhaps the butcher let the mustard merchant 
know about Mrs. Jones; but there was no easy way for 
 
 196 See generally JONATHAN COLE, ABOUT FACE (1998) (describing research and 
interviews explaining how humans exchange information through facial expressions). 
 197  See generally Virtual Privacy, supra note 140, at 16. 
 198  See id. 
 199 E. L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: To his Reputation, SCRIBNERS 
MAGAZINE, July 1890, at 66, quoted in Warren & Brandeis, supra note 44, at 217 n. 4.. 
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just anybody, out of idle curiosity or for any other reason, 
to find out.  This is changing.200 
Another new privacy advocate adds that, new retail distribution 
of sensitive personal information to the public at large increases 
the social risk of exposing previously private information to 
friends, colleagues and enemies.201 
But consumer databases cannot be meaningfully distinguished 
from gossip on the grounds that gossip causes no harm because it 
is less widely distributed.  Historically, gossip exchanged within 
small communities could cause terrible harm, because public 
commentary within those communities had powerful influence 
over others lives.202  One anthropologist notes that in an isolated 
Spanish village, [p]eople live very close to one another under 
conditions which make privacy difficult.  Every event is regarded 
as common property and is commented upon endlessly . . . .  
People are virtuous for fear of what will be said.203 
Returning to the butcher example, if buying ham were 
considered controversial within Mrs. Jones religious community, 
her reputation could suffer great damage.  When individuals are 
dependent on one another for cooperative hunting, farming, 
herding, or for access to wage labor, gossip and the reputations it 
creates can have serious economic consequences.204  Without a 
good reputation, a participant in a medieval community could not 
serve as a witness or plaintiff in a legal proceeding.205  In feudal 
society, ones right to hold land depended upon ones reputation 
for faithfulness.206  Under Roman law, an individuals rights as a 
citizen could be lost if the individual gained a reputation for bad 
moral conduct.207 
The collection of consumer information on a larger scale in a 
butchers database actually is less likely to have a harmful impact 
on Mrs. Jones life than gossip.  The few people who have access 
to the information on the database will not particularly care about 
 
 200 Virtual Privacy, supra note 140, at 16. 
 201 Avrahami, supra note 168, at 4. 
 202  See Merry, supra note 182, at 47. 
 203 See id. (quoting a study of an Andalusian town). 
 204 Id. at 59. 
 205 See Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 327-28. 
 206  See id. at 328. 
 207 See id. 
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Mrs. Jones or have any power over her, especially if Mrs. Jones is 
a typical resident of a large, anonymous urban community. 
Furthermore, commercial compilations of data about consumers 
are likely to be much more accurate than gossip.  Companies in the 
business of collecting and selling consumer information, whether it 
relates to purchasing habits or credit history, have an incentive to 
sell correct and accurate information.  Those who maintain 
commercial databases also have a concrete profit incentive to get 
the details right.  Admittedly, errors do occur at times.  Many 
complaints about private databases surface when people find errors 
in their credit reports.208  But the evidence suggests that, on the 
whole, rates of error in credit reports are low.209  Two highly 
publicized, yet biased, studies misleadingly report high rates of 
error in credit reporting (from 30 to 50 percent).210  A 1991 study 
by Consumers Union relied on its own employees and their 
acquaintances to review their own credit reports and report 
inaccuracies.211  Consumers Union did not check whether those 
claims of inaccuracy were true or false or try to identify the source 
of the errors.212  The Public Interest Research Group (PIRG) also 
failed to select a random sample in their study.213  The PIRG 
estimated an error rate from a sample of consumers who had 
reason to suspect that errors were present and who paid to have 
their credit reports reviewed.214  A more rigorous study of 15,703 
consumers, conducted by Arthur Anderson & Co., showed that the 
true error rate for non-trivial errors is probably as low as one to 
three percent.215 
Finally, databases of information about consumers tend to be 
more impersonal and protective of consumer privacy than gossip.  
 
 208  See Daniel B. Klein & Jason Richner, In Defense of the Credit Bureau, 12 CATO 
JOURNAL 393, 402-07 (1992) (discussing Consumers Union Study What Are They 
Saying About Me?, Apr. 29, 1991); Edmund Mierzwinski, Nightmare on Credit Street 
or How the Credit Bureau Ruined My Life, REPORT, UNITED STATES PUBLIC INTEREST 
RESEARCH GROUP, June 6, 1991. 
 209  See Klein, supra note 208, at 403-04. 
 210 See id. 
 211  See id. 
 212 See id. 
 213  See id. 
 214 See id. at 405-07. The PIRG study also failed to identify the source of the errors, 
and reported anecdotes featuring consumers unconfirmed assertions that their reports 
contained errors.  See Mierzwinski, supra note 208. 
 215 See Klein, supra note 208, at 407-08. 
SINGLETON.FINAL 12/28/00  7:07 PM 
132 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:97 
 
Companies that collect information about consumers carefully 
protect that information from competitors in order to preserve their 
investment .  These measures also preserve consumer privacy.  For 
example, when the company sells the use of its list to a direct 
marketer, it often does so through a third-party fulfillment house.  
The fulfillment house compiles lists, creates mailing labels, and 
attaches those labels to be sent in the mail.  The marketer does not 
even see the list or the labels, let alone the information in the files.  
To preserve its reputation, the fulfillment house must protect the 
companys list from disclosure.  Companies enforce this by 
seeding the lists with dummy entries, usually fake names and 
real addresses.  If those addresses begin to get mail from 
competitors, the company knows that the fulfillment house has 
betrayed the secrecy of its list.216 
To summarize, databases of consumer information are likely to 
be substantially less harmful than gossip.  These databases have 
also welcomed benefits, such as lower prices and better consumer 
services.  The benefit offered by gossip, i.e., greater conformance 
to social norms is unlikely to be appreciated by the subject, but he 
is apt to be pleased with a lower credit card rate. 
III. PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Few cases have addressed the potential conflict between privacy 
regulation and the First Amendment.  As it is unclear whether 
privacy regulations will be enacted, or what form they will take 
(opt out or opt in, the extent of disclosure or access 
requirements), this part will not analyze the constitutionality of 
every possible permutation of privacy regulation.  Rather, this part 
will survey the issues that are likely to arise in those cases, and 
explores how the issues should be resolved. 
Many different kinds of regulations that restrict speech and 
information already exist, from obscenity to intellectual property, 
from defamation to insider trading laws, from the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act to the FDAs mandatory labeling requirements.  Just 
what is it that makes the potential conflict between privacy 
 
 216 See Letter from Peter Vanderschraaf, California Institute of Technology, to 
Professor Dan Klein, University of California at Irvine 1 (June 23, 1995) (on file with 
author). 
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regulation and the First Amendment more difficult, or more 
interesting, than these other restrictions on speech?  In some cases, 
very little.  To say that privacy regulation raises free speech issues 
is not to say that these other regulations do not.  Clearly, 
intellectual property laws, mandatory labeling requirements, and 
defamation raise serious First Amendment issues.  To discuss how 
they are resolved is beyond the scope of this article.  Nevertheless, 
the fact that these laws coexist with the First Amendment does not 
mean that no First Amendment issue exists with respect to privacy 
regulation.  Furthermore, in resolving First Amendment cases, the 
courts examine each proposed regulation on its own merits.217  
Each regulation affects a different type of speech, is supported by a 
different rationale for regulation, and requires different tailoring.218 
Private-sector privacy regulations are distinguishable from the 
examples listed above.  Unlike intellectual property rights, 
property rights in privacy do not have constitutional sanction.  
Copyright, patent, and trademark laws affect a small range of 
potential information when compared to a system of privacy 
regulation that would give people property rights in facts about 
themselves.  Other types of regulation, such as insider trading rules 
or the Fair Credit Reporting Act, address specific problems in 
fairly narrow industry sectors.219  There are various exceptions that 
restrict the rule of freedom of information.220  Adopting all-
encompassing privacy regulations, however, would take these 
exceptions and make them the rule.  This will result in an 
extraordinarily broad array of observations and facts about real 
people and real events to be simply taken out of the shared domain 
of research.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the 
problems inherent in punishing true speech.221  An omnibus system 
 
 217  See, e.g., Thornburn v. Austin, No. 99-2146, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 25980 (8th 
Cir. 1999). 
 218  See id. 
 219  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (2000) (requiring that consumer reporting agencies 
adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, 
personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the 
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization 
of such information). 
 220  See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(6) (1996) (restricting the release of personnel and 
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy). 
 221 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (truth may not be the subject 
of either civil or criminal sanctions); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 
(1974) (finding that the First Amendment protects some falsehood in order to protect 
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of privacy regulation would mark an extremely radical change in 
the legal framework for the flow of information through the 
economy. 
The next part explores the questions that are likely to arise in 
any First Amendment challenge to privacy regulation.  The 
primary issues are whether the speech in question is classified as 
commercial or non-commercial speech, the strength of the 
governments interest in regulating the speech and whether the 
proposed legislation is narrowly tailored to suit its purpose. 
A. Is It Commercial Speech? 
Suppose Alice orders a widget from Budget Widgets.  In the 
course of the transaction, Budget learns her name, address, and 
notes that she has ordered a widget.  Her name is then transferred 
within Budget to a list of persons who might be interested in 
widget upgrades, a special widget warrantee package, or widget 
accessories.  Budget also notes the type of widget she bought - one 
particularly sized for tall people.  Budget had only recently begun 
to offer widgets in different sizes in certain test markets to 
determine whether there are enough buyers in the petite and tall 
markets to overcome problems with inventory control.  Another 
company, Case Co. makes leather carrying cases for widgets.  Case 
Co. rents the list containing information about widget buyers from 
Budget Widget, and ultimately contacts Alice. 
Obviously, some of these contacts fall within the traditional 
definitions of commercial speech, for example if Alice was 
solicited directly by phone.  But other transfers of the information, 
such as Budgets creation of the information database, its internal 
uses of the information, and its transfer to Case Co., do not fit the 
definition of commercial speech.222  The database itself, is more 
 
[truth]). 
 222 See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commn of New York, 
447 U.S. 557 (1980).  Central Hudson established the following inquiry to test the 
constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech: 
a) Does the speech accurately promote a legal product or activity? 
b) Is the governments interest in regulating the speech substantial? 
c) Does the regulation directly advance the government interest at issue? 
d) Is there a reasonable fit between the regulation and the interest it is intended  
to further?   
Id. at 564. 
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like a library than an advertisement. 
Commercial speech was first defined as speech that did no 
more than propose a commercial transaction,223 and later, more 
broadly, as expression related solely to the economic interests of 
the speaker and its audience.224  Traditionally, advertising, in-
person solicitation, and similar activities constituted commercial 
speech.225  When companies collect and use consumer data, and 
subsequently share it with other businesses for product 
development and inventory control, it does not resemble traditional 
commercial speech.  However, if the data is actually used for 
marketing, it will at least in some aspect involve commercial 
speech. 
Courts face a struggle in determining when and whether privacy 
regulations affect commercial speech and when they affect 
ordinary speech.  For example, the Supreme Court has declined to 
decide whether credit reports are commercial speech,226 although 
some lower courts had held that they are.227  Credit reports, at 
least, involve economic information.  Other databases will present 
harder issues. 
In U.S. West v. FCC,228 U.S. West argued that some of the 
speech affected by the FCC regulation, particularly the transfer of 
the information within the company, was not commercial 
speech.229  The court rejected this argument on the grounds that the 
intra-company speech was too closely related to marketing.230  The 
court stated that when the sole purpose of the intra-carrier speech 
based on CPNI is to facilitate the marketing of telecommunications 
services to individual customers, we find the speech integral to and 
inseparable from the ultimate commercial solicitation. Therefore, 
 
 223 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commn on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
385 (1973). 
 224 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561. 
 225  See id. (defining commercial speech as expression that serves the economic 
interest of the speaker while at the same time assists consumers and furthers societal 
interests in the dissemination of information). 
 226 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 n. 8 
(We . . . do not hold . . . that the [credit] report is . . . commercial speech.). 
 227 See, e.g., Millstone v. OHanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d 829, 833 (8th Cir. 1976); 
cf. Grove v. Dun & Bradstreet, 438 F.2d 433 (3d Cir. 1970) (credit reports are analogous 
to commercial speech in receiving less First Amendment protection). 
 228 182 F.3d 1224 (1999). 
 229  See id. at 1228. 
 230  See id. 
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the speech is properly categorized as commercial speech.231  The 
court examined the regulations under the Central Hudson test for 
commercial speech.232 
This approach has the advantage of simplicity, but the analysis 
will not be appropriate to all types of privacy regulation.  In the 
U.S. West case, the regulations targeted uses of CPNI for 
marketing purposes.233  Some broader proposed forms of 
regulation along European lines (e.g., state privacy bills) would 
regulate the use and trade of information for many purposes, such 
as inventory control or product development.234  The fact that some 
commercial speech might lie at either end of the process for using 
the information is fairly incidental.  The goal of the regulation is to 
control the information itself, not advertising or the attempt to sell 
a product.235 
Furthermore, determining whether a given use of data is 
considered commercial speech depends on the current status of the 
commercial speech doctrine in the Supreme Court.  When the 
commercial speech doctrine first evolved, part of the rationale for 
giving commercial speech limited protection was that it was valued 
less than political speech.236  But the Court has taken steps in 
recent years away from that approach.237 
First, commercial speech has recognized value to consumers.  
Empirical studies of advertising, conducted in the decades after the 
commercial speech doctrine came into existence, reject the view 
that advertising and marketing are essentially exploitive activities 
that are of no benefit to consumers.238  Today, advertising is 
understood to enhance competition between similar products and 
to lower prices.  This leads to higher quality products and more 
choices.  Should the Supreme Court consider a challenge to 
privacy regulation to affect only, or primarily, commercial speech 
 
 231 See id. at 1233. 
 232  See id. at 1233-39. 
 233  See U.S. West, 182 F.3d 1224. 
 234  See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the 
U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 541 (1995). 
 235  See Anita L. Allen, Privacy as Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral 
Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861, 863 (2000). 
 236  See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 (1986). 
 237  See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410 (1993). 
 238 See generally JOHN E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION: ADVERTISING AND 
REGULATION (1997). 
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as opposed to ordinary speech?  If so, the value of commercial 
speech will certainly be raised again with a vengeance.  Courts 
have already recognized the value of credit reporting to 
consumers.239  Data about consumer transactions is widely used 
throughout the economy to start new companies, charities, 
grassroots political groups, to develop new products, to establish 
new markets, to dramatically lower the costs of distributing 
products, and to control fraud.  There is no question that this has 
benefited U.S. consumers.  For example, credit card rates in the 
United States are generally much lower than in Europe.240  In this 
sense, networks that relay information about transactional behavior 
have produced general benefits that may not be entirely captured 
by the private economic actors that invested in their creation.  
These networks have some of the characteristics of public 
goods.241 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the ranking of certain 
types of speech as having less value than other types of speech has 
a dubious constitutional pedigree.  It is not clear whether the 
framers of the Constitution intended the Federal Government to 
protect primarily political speech, and not private speech.242  Much 
has been made of the fact that the framers evidently did not 
entirely disapprove of libel and defamation law.243  Many of these 
discussions entirely neglect that libel law was state law244 and the 
Constitution intended to describe only the powers of the federal 
 
 239 See, e.g., Wilson v. Retail Credit Co., 325 F. Supp. 460, 467 (S.D. Miss. 1971), 
affd, 457 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972); Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 
1978). 
 240  See International: Americans Heat Up the U.K. Credit Card Market, CREDIT CARD 
NEWS (Oct. 1, 1999) (stating that few credit card offers overseas are as low as what U.S. 
banks have made to individuals stateside). 
 241 A public good is nonexclusive, meaning that someone can enjoy the good without 
paying for it.  Also, the consumption of a public good is non-rivalrous, meaning that 
when one person uses the good, he does not diminish the benefits that anyone else can 
receive from it.  See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (1998). 
 242  See O. Lee Reed, A Free Speech Metavalue for the Next Millennium: Autonomy of 
Consciousness in First Amendment Theory and Practice, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 9 (1997) 
(describing that Justice Brandeis, in Whitney v. California, stated that the Framers 
believed the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties, but 
he immediately followed by asserting that free speech is a means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth and that public discussion is a political duty). 
 243  See generally William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a 
Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91 (1984). 
 244 See id. at 126, n. 182 (1984) (citing 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2151 (1798) and 
discussing the remarks of John Nicholas, Edward Livingston, and Albert Gallatin). 
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government.245  The question of whether the framers would 
tolerate libel law does not resolve whether they intended the 
federal government to have any powers over speech. 
The history and structure of the First Amendment suggests that 
the framers had no intention to regulate speech.  Federalists such as 
James Wilson246 and Alexander Hamilton247 argued that the Bill of 
Rights was not necessary because the Constitution supposedly 
gave the government no power to do those things that the Bill of 
Rights prohibits.248  Madison also shared this view, and ultimately 
supported the Bill of Rights as politically necessary to persuade 
opponents to ratify the Constitution.249  The framers thus had no 
intention that the federal government have the power to regulate 
speech, and with that in mind it cannot be true to the Constitution 
to treat some speech as different from other speech. 
Furthermore, the Ninth Amendment makes it clear that even if 
the First Amendment can be interpreted to protect only or 
primarily political speech, the Ninth Amendment stands in reserve 
to protect our rights to learn things about other human beings in the 
more ordinary course of our lives.250  In short, it is a mistake to 
think that the First Amendment gives us our rights of free 
speech.251  Rather, those rights already exist: the First Amendment 
merely sets out some of the rights that are to be protected, but it 
 
 245 See id. at 125 (Nowhere in the constitutional convention or the state ratification 
debates is there anything close to an understanding that the Constitution was meant to 
impart or to countenance a federal power to punish seditious libel.). 
 246 See James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard, Oct. 6, 1787 in 2 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 167-72 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., State Historical Soc. of Wis. 1976). 
 247 Alexander Hamilton wrote that: 
[A] bill of rights . . . is not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution but 
would even be dangerous, and that [any bill of rights] would contain various 
exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very account, would 
afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare 
that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why for instance, 
should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no 
power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? . . .  [T]he  Constitution 
is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a Bill of Rights. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-15 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 248  See id. 
 249 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 94 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 250  JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-41 
(1980) (discussing the reasoning behind the enactment of the Ninth Amendment). 
 251  See id. 
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was never intended to be an exclusive list.252  As Justice Black 
pointed out long ago, whatever the framers may have thought of 
the value of different kinds of speech, they evidently thought that 
the federal government could not be trusted with such subjective 
questions.253  There is also no indication that the courts were 
supposed to be involved in making such evaluative decisions in 
selecting some categories of speech for more protection than 
others.254 
This appears relevant in answering questions about privacy 
regulation because the Supreme Court has in some areas treated 
information about public figures and newsworthy events 
differently than they would private speech.255  This trend began 
when the constitutionality of many privacy torts came into 
question and newsworthy speech was considered the only speech 
worthy of protection.256  The Court then gathered entertaining 
speech into the fold of the constitutionally protected.257  
Commercial speech, fighting words, and obscenity were left out.  
In recent years, true commercial speech has to a great extent been 
brought back in and afforded greater protection.258 It would 
 
 252 See id. 
 253 Justice Black stated: 
[P]eople were afraid of the new Federal Government.  I hope that they have not 
wholly lost that fear up to this time because, while government is a wonderful 
and an essential thing in order to have any kind of liberty, order or peace, it has 
such power that people must always remember to check them here and balance 
them there and limit them here in order to see that you do not lose too much 
liberty in exchange for government. 
Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment Absolutes: A Public Interview, 37 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 557 (1962).  See also Solveig Singleton, Reviving a First 
Amendment Absolutism for the Internet, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279, 300-05 (1999). 
 254 See Gilles, supra note 83, at 741. 
 255 This is particularly true in the area of libel law.  See, e.g., New York Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  See Gilles, supra note 83, at 736-40; Dun & Bradstreet, 
472 U.S. at 758 (stating that the actual malice standard of libel law does not apply to 
speech that is not of public concern).  See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 
475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
 256 See Diane L. Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 J. ART & 
ENT. LAW 35, 58, notes 59-63 (1998). 
 257 See id. 
 258 See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 497-98 (1996) 
(abandoning Posadas case); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus. and Profl Regulation, Bd. of 
Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (state ban of truthful use of terms CPA and CFP 
by accountants is unconstitutional); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 
U.S. 410 (1993); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 781 (1993); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. 
514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
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logically follow that the treatment of other truthful private speech 
would keep up.  The constitutionality of libel, misappropriation, 
and the right of publicity have not caught up entirely with these 
developments. 
The idea of holding some true speech as less valuable than other 
true speech makes little sense.259  It raises the problem of 
distinguishing speech that is of public concern from speech that is 
not.260  It comes dangerously close to contradicting the well-
established principle that the press should not enjoy special 
privileges under the First Amendment to defy laws that others must 
obey.261  Any special status for matters of public concern or 
special exemptions for the press are likely to be increasingly 
incoherent in the age of the Internet, which is breaking these 
boundaries down.  The structure and language of the Constitution 
do not protect only political speech, but ordinary private speech as 
well.262 
In summary, it does not automatically follow that because 
companies involved in the transfer of transactional data about 
consumers are for-profit and that the information is sold, that the 
speech in question must be characterized as commercial speech.  
Regardless of whether it is determined to be commercial speech or 
ordinary private speech, in the system of unregulated flow of 
information in the economy, speech as a whole has substantial 
benefits for consumers.  Thus it is in the public interest to extend 
First Amendment protection to such speech. 
 
 259 See Gilles, supra note 83, at 739. 
The Court has failed to offer any rationale for holding that some true speech is 
of more importance than other true speech, or to use its terminology, that some 
true speech is of public concern, and other true speech is not . . . . [T]he Court 
lacks any doctrinal or theoretical basis from which to assert that valueless true 
speech exists. 
See id. 
 260 See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ([T]he five 
Members of the Court voting to affirm the damages award in this case have provided 
almost no guidance as to what constitutes a protected matter of public concern.). 
 261  Cf., id. at 781-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Perhaps most importantly, the 
argument that Gertz should be limited to the media misapprehends our cases. We protect 
the press to ensure the vitality of First Amendment guarantees.  This solicitude implies no 
endorsement of the principle that speakers other than the press deserve lesser First 
Amendment protection.). 
 262  See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) (holding that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making private possession of obscene material a 
crime); see also William C. Heffeinan, Privacy Rights, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 737, 754 
(1995). 
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B. The Nature of the Governments Interest 
Determining the nature and strength of the governments interest 
in particular privacy laws and regulations also poses a challenge 
for courts considering the constitutionality of privacy 
regulations.263  Commentators often lump Fourth Amendment 
claims attempting to regulate ones body or person together with 
databases containing consumer data in order to assert that there is a 
general interest or basic right to something called privacy.264 
It would be remiss of the courts to treat privacy as an amorphous 
lump in considering the constitutionality of private sector privacy 
regulations.  To begin with, government violations of privacy do 
not raise First Amendment issues at all.265  The very existence of 
the Constitution is founded on the premise that government is a 
necessarily evil and that it poses a unique threat to liberty that 
private sector actors do not.266  Therefore, whatever rights the 
private sector may violate in gathering information, these are not 
constitutional rights.267  The court in U.S. West properly asked the 
government to assert an interest in privacy regulations that was not 
founded on constitutional privacy cases.268 
 
 263 See Zimmerman, Real People, supra note 108, at 368 ([P]rivacy interests as a 
general matter lack the ratification conferred by long historical acceptance.  Privacy as a 
tort-protected interest goes back less than a century, and its legal status is still relatively 
weak when compared to defamation.). 
 264 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 413-15 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) 
(describing privacy as a basic right stemming from the Constitution). 
 265 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1971) (An agent acting - albeit unconstitutionally - in the name of the United 
States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising 
no authority other than his own.). 
 266 See id. 
 267 See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 326 notes 14-17 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(describing the distinction between common law and constitutional privacy claims); 
Drake v. Covington County Bd. of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974, 980 (M.D. Ala. 1974) 
(Johnson, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Warren-Brandeis right of privacy is a creature 
of state law and is not constitutionally based); Mimms v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. 
352 F. Supp. 862, 865 n. 5 (E. D. Pa. 1972) (distinguishing right of privacy from 
constitutional cases); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (constitutional right to 
privacy limited to unreasonable government searches or interference with matters relating 
to family and reproduction). 
 268 In U.S. West, the court explained that: 
The breadth of the concept of privacy requires us to pay particular attention to 
attempts by the government to assert privacy as a substantial state interest . . . . 
We emphasize that the privacy interest in this case is distinct and different from 
the more limited notion of a constitutional right to privacy which is addressed in 
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Although the privacy claims asserted against the private sector 
are not constitutional claims, courts may analogize between private 
sector and Fourth Amendment privacy cases.  Under both Fourth 
Amendment law and private sector privacy cases, the question of 
the peoples expectation of privacy has become part of the 
definition of privacy.269  This analogy, however, does not favor 
broad expectations of privacy rights in the private sector because 
the interpretation of privacy expectations in the Fourth 
Amendment context is very narrow.270  Evidently, one would not 
reasonably expect that the police would not read their homes heat 
signature271 or pick through their garbage.272  It is difficult to 
understand how one could reasonably expect operators of web sites 
or stores not to make notes of information about their customers  
the very same information that merchants historically have stored 
away in their memories in the course of ordinary transactions. 
Justifications for the extension of privacy rights against the 
private sector taken alone, however, suffer from a similar lack of 
precision in attempting to assert a government interest. The court 
in U.S. West concluded that the governments interest in the CPNI 
regulations was to protect people from embarrassing revelations 
about who they had called and when.273 The court noted that the 
government cannot satisfy the second prong of the Central 
Hudson test by merely asserting a broad interest in privacy, and 
called for a particular description of the type of privacy served. 274  
The court added that privacy is not an absolute good because it 
imposes real costs on society.  Therefore, the specific privacy 
interest must be substantial, demonstrating that the state has 
 
cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut . . . and Roe v. Wade. 
U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1234, n. 4. 
 269  See OConnor Et Al. v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)  The Court stated that they: 
[H]ave no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that 
society is prepared to accept as reasonable.  Instead, the Court has given 
weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, 
the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our societal 
understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from 
government invasion.  Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
See id. 
 270  See generally Gormley, supra note 7. 
 271 See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991), affd on 
other grounds, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 272 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 273 See U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1237-38. 
 274 Id. at 1234-35. 
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considered the proper balancing of the benefits and harms of 
privacy.275 The court reluctantly concluded, that this was a 
substantial state interest, though not sufficiently well supported in 
the FCCs record.276 
The courts skepticism is well founded.  The extension of 
privacy rights against the private sector is commonly supported by 
the theory that such rights are essential to human dignity, to 
maintain and develop ones personality, and so on.277  Courts have 
sometimes echoed these arguments in defamation cases.278  
However, these arguments are problematic as constitutional 
arguments.  They are unlikely to hold up well in making the case 
for the constitutionality of broad privacy regulation lacking the 
historic pedigree of defamation.279  What exactly is human 
dignity?  Assuming human dignity is defined, should all actions 
that violate human dignity be illegal?280  How is human dignity 
offended if Safeway learns through a Safeway card that I am in the 
habit of buying pineapples and do not own my own home?  Our 
intuitive understanding of human dignity and human rights is 
probably sufficient to allow us to understand that we ought not to 
 
 275 Id. at 1235. 
 276 Id. 
 277 See Roscoe Pound, Interest of Personality, 28 HARV. L. REV. 343, 362-63 (1915) 
(privacy torts protect mental peace and individual comfort); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy 
as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 
970-71 (1964) (individual dignity); Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and 
Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41, 53 
(1974) (describing the sensational exposure of the intimate details of a private life in the 
mass media as a deeply intrusive impairment of the intimacy and inner space necessary to 
individuality and human dignity). 
 278 See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 757-58. 
 279 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. at 388.  The Court stated: 
One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast 
range of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private 
citizens and public officials.  Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is 
a concomitant of life in a civilized community.  The risk of this exposure is an 
essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom 
of speech and press. 
See id. 
 280 See Zimmerman, Requiem, supra note 70, at 339.  Stating that: 
[A]lthough human dignity is an important value, it is hard to define, identify, 
and measure.  Moreover, the existence of an arguably fundamental interest in 
dignity does not lead inexorably to the conclusions that law can or should shield 
it from all possible assaults.  Many important human values, such as loyalty to 
friends or the love of parents for their children, are either unprotected by law 
entirely or can be enforced by it only tangentially. 
See id. 
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be subject to torture by the police, or to starve prisoners of war.  
But it does not bring us to the understanding that it is wrong for 
businesses to collect data about their customers without the 
customers consent, especially given the fact that we routinely do 
this sort of information gathering in our ordinary private lives.281  
While we often desire to conceal facts about ourselves from 
others,282 we also at times have an interest in learning information 
about others.283 
A concept that sees information gathering for the purpose of 
commerce as an offense to human dignity, must suppose that 
human dignity is very fragile.  Do we really need the federal 
government to protect us from being embarrassed?  Can we assert 
a right not to be embarrassed?  Surely a government interest in 
protecting human dignity must be founded on something more 
substantial than vague fears that someone somewhere may obtain 
information about you and might use that information to try to sell 
you products, or annoy you with junk mail.284  And how is it 
consonant with human dignity to prevent businesses from 
communicating truthful information about real events to other 
businesses?  What about the dangers to human dignity from 
paternalism?  Whatever the interests in human dignity or 
personality are, they are arguably not constitutional interests and 
certainly not constitutional rights.  These arguments are vague and 
lack even the common-sense impulses that underlie the assertions 
of government interest in regulating such things as alcohol, 
gambling, and the like. 
The next part explores how a government interest in privacy 
regulation might be supported by the assertion of better-defined 
interests, whether merely substantial or compelling. 
 
 281 See id. at 326-35 (describing sociological evidence on the value and function of 
gossip). 
 282 See Prosser, Privacy, supra note 70, at 399 (1978) (sheer self-interest motivates 
desire for privacy). 
 283  See infra pp. 124-30 (discussion on gossip). 
 284 To bring the issue of annoyance into perspective, consider that the Court has held 
many times that the First Amendment protects unpleasant speech.  Speech that angers the 
public is protected.  See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (describing speech 
that angers the public).  To justify a ban on speech, words must incite a listener to 
violence.  See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (stating that the speech at 
issue must be likely to . . . produce [a violent] action). 
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1. A Dubious Assertion of Market Failure 
One position the government might take is to assert that privacy 
regulation is not really an attempt to control speech at all, but is 
merely an economic regulation intended to correct a market failure.  
This theory assumes that consumers do not know how companies 
are using the data collected about them or how extensive that data 
collection is.  According to this theory, the market needs more 
information to operate effectively.  The evidence of market failure 
would be that consumers widely report concern about privacy in 
surveys, but that the marketplace continues perversely with its 
trade in consumer transaction data without offering opt-out or 
opt-in programs.  As far as government interests are concerned, 
however, the support for this theory is relatively weak. 
First, the regulations in question are clearly content-based.  
These regulations turn on whether the information in question was 
personal, described purchases, or was individually identifiable.  
Let us assume for this discussion that the government admits to 
regulating speech and states that its interest in regulating speech is 
the asserted market failure. 
The concept of market failure proposed by our hypothetical 
defenders of privacy regulation is a flawed one.  Some decades 
ago, economists began to experiment with models of markets in 
which they assumed away information costs or transaction costs.285  
They noted that these markets satisfied certain definitions of 
efficiency.286  These models were valuable for explaining certain 
trends in real markets.  But they were not intended to be used as a 
normative standard by which to judge the operation of markets in 
the real world, any more than it would be appropriate to use a 
world in which labor costs, transportation costs, or material costs 
were zero.  In the real world, information is a scarce good along 
with other goods. 
The question of how much information consumers are willing to 
purchase with their valuable time and resources is a question that 
the markets themselves should answer.  For example, the market 
for lawnmowers would not be more efficient if lawnmower 
 
 285  See generally Aric Rindfleisch and Jan B. Heide, Transaction Cost Analysis: Past, 
Present, and Future Applications, 61 J. MKTG. 30 (1997). 
 286  See id. 
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companies were required to hand out 500 page reports on 
metallurgy along with their products.  According to the theory that 
a failure of information represents a market failure, this booklet 
would bring consumers closer to a state of perfect information and 
improve efficiency.  It is not rational, however, for consumers to 
spend their time reading a book about metallurgy before 
purchasing a lawnmower.  Moreover, the benefits of reading the 
information are likely to be little or none.  Chances are low that the 
lawnmower will malfunction due to poor metallurgy.  Furthermore, 
in acquiring the information, the consumer would incur 
opportunity costs - the lost time he could have used for some other 
purpose.  Thus, moving a market closer to perfect information in 
this artificial manner would not benefit consumers. 
Should consumers want to do so, they are certainly free to seek 
out information about how companies collect and use information 
about them.287  Consumers are aware at a general level that this 
practice occurs fairly extensively, as indicated by answers to 
survey questions about their privacy concerns.288  But, it takes time 
and resources to generate detailed notices of how information is 
gathered and used.  Given that there is little or no harm to 
consumers from the gathering of this information in the ordinary 
commercial context, it may simply be inefficient for markets to be 
providing this information at all. 
How do we reconcile this argument with the survey results 
showing that consumers care about privacy?  It is relatively simple.  
Surveys report consumer preferences under circumstances that do 
not force consumers to consider the costs of their choices.  It does 
not cost a consumer anything to say that he values privacy on a 
survey.289  But in the real world, exercising that preference would 
cost him time and perhaps money.  Markets do not reflect 
consumer preferences in a vacuum, but rather reflect how strong 
 
 287 Consumers can request to see the files that companies hold and can correct 
mistakes, block disclosure, and find out where information about them has been sent.  
Consumers can also check credit reports and insist on giving permission before 
information contained in the reports are released.  See American Survey: We Know 
Youre Reading This, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, at 28. 
 288  See, e.g., http://ibm.com/privacy.html; http//cnn.com/privacy.html (describing 
each companys privacy policies). 
 289 See American Survey: We Know Youre Reading This, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1996, 
at 28.  (stating that while Americans feel they have lost all control over personal 
information, they are still willing to fill out warranty cards, questionnaires, and surveys). 
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those preferences are when compared to other preferences (such as 
low prices for goods and services, or prompt customer service), 
taking into account the costs of each.  In other words, consumers 
may say one thing while doing another.  Because markets in reality 
respond to what consumers do, not what they say, the markets 
reflect the balance of costs and benefits in a way that surveys 
simply cannot.  For this reason, surveys are not a reliable guide to 
how markets ought to respond.  The failure of a market to produce 
a good when consumers say they want it is not evidence of market 
failure. 
Insofar as consumer concerns about privacy matter enough to the 
consumers to spur them into action, companies are responding by 
offering more detailed privacy policies.290  For example, many 
company websites offer links to the details of their privacy 
policies.291  Other companies are responding by offering 
affirmative benefits like free computers in exchange for consumer 
information, which appear to satisfy consumer concerns about 
privacy very well.292  As economist Tom Hazlett once observed in 
discussing regulation of the broadcast industry, what the 
government describes as marketplace failure is, more often than 
not, simply a failure by regulatory agencies to agree with choices 
made by consumers.293  This seems to be true of apparent market 
failures regarding privacy as well. 
2. Fraud and Identity Theft  Security, Not Privacy 
A hard look at the ordinary business practice of collecting and 
trading consumer information reveals little concrete harm to 
consumers from which the government can assert an interest in 
protecting them from.  This is the main stumbling block those 
asserting a government interest in privacy regulation will have to 
face.  The courts have traditionally addressed one concrete harm - 
the existence of data about consumers in a database creates a target 
 
 290  See supra note 288. 
 291  See id. 
 292  See, e.g., Free PCs  With a Catch, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 8, 1999, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,17783,00.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2000). 
 293 Thomas W. Hazlett, Market Failure as a Justification to Regulation Broadcast 
Communications, printed in RATIONALES & RATIONALIZATIONS: REGULATING THE 
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, (Robert Corn-Revere ed., 1997). 
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for thieves, hackers, stalkers, and perpetrators of fraud.294  
Arguably, narrowly tailored responses to the problems of fraud, 
identity theft, and stalking are already embodied in other laws.295  
There is no doubt that such activities are illegal.296  The question is 
whether it is appropriate to take the additional step of regulating 
private databases for the sake of lowering the risk of fraud and 
identity theft? 
First, one problem with this argument is that most types of 
privacy regulations that have been proposed have nothing to do 
with combating fraud.  It does not matter whether a consumer has 
notice or has consented to the inclusion of his data in a library of 
information; if the database is insufficiently secure, he may still be 
a victim of identity theft.  Similarly, databases today that consist of 
data collected without consent or elaborate notice provisions may 
be very secure or very insecure.  Thus, the security argument does 
not help us to address the question of the constitutionality of an 
opt-out or opt-in regime. 
Second, some of the regulations contemplated and supported by 
privacy advocates would actually make security problems 
substantially worse.  As a general matter, companies are more 
likely to fall victim to fraud (for which consumers ultimately pay) 
when they know less about the person with whom they are dealing.  
If all a company knows is a customers name (for example Tom 
Smith), it is likely to be bamboozled by somebody else calling up 
and claiming to be Tom Smith.  If the company knows the name 
and social security number, it is slightly less likely to be 
bamboozled; the pretender would have to know Toms social 
security number, as well.  If the company knows the name, social 
 
 294  See, e.g., AT&T Comm. v. Pacific Bell, 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13459 (1998) 
(holding that defendants had violated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by using plaintiffs 
electronic billing databases for marketing purposes); see also, CCO Info. Serv. v. 
MacLean Huter Mkt. Reports, 44 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that databases 
should be protected from illegitimate use by third parties and that Congress should be 
able to protect such compilations through the copyright laws even if a directory contains 
absolutely no protectable written expression);  see also, Jones v. Federated Fin. Reserve 
Corp., 144 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 1998) (involving a person who obtained a credit report on 
roommates ex-spouse).  
 295  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9 (1999) (stalking); CAL. PENAL CODE § 13848 
(2000) (prevention of technology related crimes); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190-25 (1998) 
(criminal impersonation); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.45 (stalking in the fourth degree); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2913.21 (2000) (misuse of credit cards); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2903.211 (2000) (menacing by stalking). 
 296  See supra note 295. 
SINGLETON.FINAL 12/28/00  7:07 PM 
2000] PRIVACY VERSUS THE FIRST AMENDMENT 149 
 
security number, and fingerprint or voiceprint, Toms imposter is 
going to have a very hard time.  Insofar as privacy regulation 
makes it more burdensome for companies to exchange analysis 
about perpetrators of fraud and persons identities, it is likely to 
increase, not decrease, losses from fraud. 
Identity theft is a particularly hard problem to address.  If 
someone claims that a certain purchase on a credit card bill is not 
really his, how do you know he is not lying?  One can only know if 
one can establish his identity, and the identity of the purchaser, but 
that is precisely what is at issue.  Therefore, the most appropriate 
response to the problem of identity theft might be to develop 
different enforcement mechanisms.  Special courts could be 
established to deal with identity theft, where victims could 
establish their identities and obtain new identities more quickly.  
The answer, however, is certainly not restricting the private sector 
right to gather information. 
Another respect in which privacy regulation might make security 
problems worse is by demanding that consumers be able to access 
the files of information kept about them to make changes or 
corrections.  The question then becomes, just who is this person 
that is claiming the right to access Sally Joness file?  Is it Sally 
Jones or someone who happens to know her maiden name? 
The reality is that informational security and privacy are quite 
different issues.  Often, the best solution to security problems is to 
get more information about consumers, not less.  Privacy 
regulations as proposed thus far are therefore mostly irrelevant to, 
or affirmatively harmful to, security interests. 
C. Narrow Tailoring 
The final prong in determining if speech is commercial speech 
requires that the regulation in question be narrowly tailored.297  In 
cases involving commercial speech, the regulation need not be the 
least restrictive alternative, but it should at least be shaped in some 
way to carry out the governments stated interest.  How inquiries 
into the constitutionality of private regulation turn out will largely 
depend on the details of the regulation in question and the nature of 
 
 297  See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565 citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
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the governments asserted interest.  This part offers a few general 
observations. 
Of the proposals to regulate the uses of data by private-sector 
companies, the most narrowly tailored would probably consist of 
regulations intended to address concerns about negligent or 
reckless security practices or identity theft.  These regulations 
would duplicate existing common law obligations so that federal 
regulations may not be needed.  There is no reason to suppose that 
private companies want to have insecure systems or treacherous, 
psychotic employees. If such regulations were passed, they would 
most likely have to pass a tailoring inquiry. 
The next type of regulation concerns pure disclosure 
requirements.  This type of regulation would be particularly 
tailored to the market failure argument described above.  This is 
not to say that disclosure requirements would not be somewhat 
burdensome, particularly for small businesses.  There is always the 
question of how much disclosure is necessary, in what size font, 
and whether or not anyone will read it. 
The next most burdensome type of regulation would establish 
mandatory opt-out lists.  Though these are much less 
burdensome than opt-in requirements, for some uses of 
information, opt-out may simply be inappropriate.  If one is 
collecting information on who does not pay debts, it defeats the 
purpose of the list to allow consumers to opt-out.  There may be 
some uses of data, therefore, for which even an opt-out 
requirement is too much. 
The types of regulation most likely to run into substantial trouble 
on constitutional grounds are opt-in requirements, or outright 
bans on the transfer of certain information. The U.S. West court 
found that the FCCs failure to adequately consider an obvious 
and substantially less restrictive alternative, an opt-out strategy, 
indicates that it did not narrowly tailor the CPNI regulations 
regarding customer approval.298  The FCC argued that because 
several people that were asked to opt-in refused to do so or hung 
up, no narrower regulation would suffice.299  The court found that 
this evidence was ambivalent - the customers may simply have 
been averse to marketing generally, and not responding to 
 
 298 U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1238-39. 
 299  See id. 
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particular concerns about CPNI.300  The court missed a more 
important flaw in the FCCs argument - the FCC presumed that the 
customers had a right to veto the companys use of their CPNI.301  
But the extent and nature of this right is exactly what is at issue in 
this case. 
Access requirements also pose a substantial constitutional 
problem, because they appear to be unrelated to any substantial 
government interest.  For most uses of data (with the exception of 
credit reports) it will not particularly matter whether the data in 
question is in error.  Additionally, access mandates undercut 
attempts to fight identity theft and fraud.  Such access 
requirements create security problems as previously discussed.302  
Many mid-sized and smaller businesses, and any business in a 
controversial line of trade, are likely to find the risk unmanageable 
and the cost of setting up access mechanisms prohibitive.  Access 
regimes also have broad potential for abuse.  For example, a small 
store that sells gay, Christian, or pro-choice literature might find 
itself bombarded by enough access requests from consumers, all of 
which must be processed and answered according to regulation, to 
overwhelm its staff. 
CONCLUSION 
The restrictions declared unconstitutional by the Tenth Circuit in 
U.S. West affected only a certain type of telephone call related 
data, and were specifically intended to address the use of that data 
for marketing.  Many proposed regulatory schemes are much 
broader, such as those in effect in Europe, proposed in various U.S. 
states, or in Congressional bills proposing to regulate the collection 
of information over the Internet.  The fact that the U.S. West court 
could not uphold the constitutionality of the privacy regulations 
proposed by the FCC suggests that broader regulation will face 
significant obstacles in the courts. 
 
 
 300  See id. 
 301  See generally id. (At issue in the case were regulations requiring 
telecommunication companies to obtain affirmative approval from customers before the 
company could use a customers CPNI, presupposing that customers could refuse such 
approval.). 
 302  See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
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Restricting companies use of information about transactions and 
consumer preferences raises troublesome First Amendment issues.  
Throughout history, people have generally been free to learn about 
one another in the course of business transactions and other day-to-
day contacts.  Restrictions that alter this default rule sweep a 
potentially enormous pool of facts and ideas out of the shared 
domain. 
The conflict between privacy regulation and the First 
Amendment provides an occasion for the courts to re-examine 
certain peculiarities of the tests for the validity of commercial 
speech and private speech.  Problem areas in the current speech 
doctrine include: (a) placing a higher value on certain types of 
truthful speech than other speech, particularly the idea that 
commercial speech is of low value; (b) the treatment of outright 
bans on commercial speech under a higher standard of scrutiny 
than partial bans.  If a ban is only partial, this properly goes to the 
question of the narrowness of tailoring, not the standard of 
scrutiny; and (c) the view that commercial speech is easily chilled 
because it is for profit.  This factor cannot distinguish commercial 
speech from newspapers or other publishing activities. 
Assuming that current speech doctrines remain fundamentally 
unchanged, however, courts should be skeptical of privacy 
regulation for several reasons.  The governments asserted interest 
in privacy has not been convincingly articulated.  The real harms 
that might be occasioned by the existence of a database, such as 
the use of the data in fraud or identity theft, have little to do with 
privacy.  Fraud concerns are not addressed even by restrictive 
opt-in requirements except in the broad sense that opt-in 
renders the creation of many databases impossible, and thus may 
lower an individuals risk of identity theft by some miniscule 
factor.  Because the exchange of information actually helps to 
combat fraud and identity theft, regulations are likely to do more 
harm than good. 
The injury that stems from the collection of data most often 
brought forward by advocates of regulation - harm to the human 
personality or risks of embarrassment - relies on an exaggerated 
view of human frailty.  The view that we have a right not to be 
embarrassed or made uneasy by collections of information has no 
constitutional status.  In fact, courts are traditionally skeptical of 
such subjective harms that border on the imaginary.  This parody 
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from The Onion perhaps best makes the point: 
New Phone Book Raising Serious Privacy Issues: Palo Alto, 
CAAlarmed by the ever-shrinking security and rights of 
individuals in the information age, the Palo Alto-based group 
Citizens For Privacy is calling for strict controls to be placed on 
phone booksprinted directories of all the telephone numbers in 
a specified area.  With this new piece of technology, CFP head 
Nadine Geary said, anyone could know your phone number in 
literally seconds.  Exacerbating the situation, Geary said, is the 
fact that, in many cases, the subjects address is also printed right 
next to the number.  If this device is allowed to be distributed, 
Geary said, literally anyone would be able to track you down at 
any time.  Its frightening.303 
 
 303 http://www.theonion.com/onion3213/indes3213.html (visited October 30, 1997) 
(on file with author). 
